Wednesday 2 February 2011

Bail

Bail is some form of property deposited or pledged to a court to persuade it to release a suspect from jail, on the understanding that the suspect will return for trial or forfeit the bail (and possibly be brought up on charges of the crime of failure to appear).
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bail

The main reasons for refusing bail are that the defendant is accused of an imprisonable offence and there are substantial grounds for believing that the defendant would:
Abscond
Commit further offences whilst on bail
Interfere with witnesses

The court may also refuse bail:
For the defendant's own protection
Where the defendant is already serving a custodial sentence for another offence
Where the court is satisfied that it has not been practicable to obtain sufficient information
Where the defendant has already absconded in the present proceedings
Where the defendant has been convicted but the court is awaiting a pre-sentence report, other report or inquiry and it would be impracticable to complete the inquiries or make the report without keeping the defendant in custody
Where the defendant is charged with a non-imprisonable offence, has already been released on bail for the offence with which he is now accused, and has been arrested for absconding or breaching bail

The court should take into account the:
Nature and seriousness of the offence or default (and the probable method of dealing with the defendant for it)
Character, antecedents, associations and community ties of the defendant,
Defendant's bail record, and
Strength of the evidence

Article 21

Maneka Gandhi vs Union of India
http://www.governindia.org/wiki/Maneka_Gandhi_vs_Union_of_India
Maneka Gandhi vs Union of India
Petitioner: Maneka Gandhi
Respondent: Union of India

Headnote
The petitioner was issued a passport on June 1, 1976 under the Passport Act, 1967. On the 4th of July 1977, the petitioner received a letter dated 2nd July, 1977, from the Regional Passport Officer Delhi intimating to her that it was decided by the Government of India to impound her passport under s. 10(3)(c) of the Act "in public interest". The petitioner was required to surrender her passport within 7 days from the receipt of that letter.
The petitioner immediately addressed a letter to the Regional Passport Officer requesting him to furnish a copy of the statement of reasons for making the order as provided in s.10(5). A reply was sent by the Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs on 6th July 1977 stating inter-alia that the Government decided "in the interest of the general public" not to furnish her copy of the statement of reasons for the making of the order. The petitioner thereupon filed the present Writ Petition challenging action of the Government in- impounding her passport and declining to give reasons for doing so. The Act was enacted on 24-4-67 in view of the decision of this Court in Satwant Singh Sawhney's case. The position which obtained prior to the coming into force of the Act was that there was no law regulating the issue of passports for leaving the shores of India and going abroad. The issue of passport was entirely within the unguided and unchannelled discretion of the Executive. In Satwant Singh's case, this Court bell by a majority that the expression 'personal liberty' in Article 21 takes in, the right of locomotion and travel abroad and under Art. 21 no person can be deprived of his right to go abroad except according to the procedure established by law. This decision was accepted by the Parliament and the infirmity pointed but by it was set right by the enactment of the Passports Act, 1967.
The preamble of the Act shows that it was enacted to provide for the issue of passport and travel documents to regulate the departure from India of citizens of India and other persons and for incidental and ancillary matters. Section 3 provides that no person shall denart from or attempt to depart from India unless he holds in this 'behalf a valid passport or travel document. Section 5(1) provides for making of an application for issue of a passport or travel document for visiting foreign country. Sub-section (2) of section 5 says that on receipt of such application the Passport Authority, after making such enquiry, if any, as it may consider necessary, shall, by order in writing, issue or refuse to issue the passport or travel document or make or refuse to make that passport or travel document endorsement in respect of one or more of the foreign countries specified in the application. Sub-section (3) requires the Passport Authority where it refuses to issue the passport or travel document or to make any endorsement to record in writing a brief statement of its reasons for making such order. Section 6(1) lays down the grounds on which the Passport Authority shall refuse to make an endorsement for visiting any foreign country and provides that on no other ground the endorsement shall be refused. Section 6(2) specifies the grounds on which alone and on no other grounds the Passport Authority shall refuse to issue the Passport or travel document for visiting any foreign country and amongst various grounds set out there the last is that in the opinion of the Central Government the issue of passport or travel document to the applicant will not be in the public interest. Sub-section (1) of section 10 empowers the Passport Authority to vary or cancel the endorsement on a passport or travel document or to vary or cancel it on the conditions subject to which a passport or travel document has been issued having regard to, inter alia, the provisions of s. 6(1) or any notification under s. 19. Sub-section (2) confers powers on the Passport Authority to vary or cancel the conditions of the passport or travel document on the application of the holder of the passport or travel document and with the previous approval of the Central Government. Sub-section (3) provides that the Passport Authority may impound or cause to be impounded or revoke a passport or travel document on the grounds set out in cl. (a) to (h). The order impounding the passport in the present, case, was made by the Central Government under cl. (c) which reads as follows :-
"(c) If the passport authority deems it necessary so to do in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of India, friendly relations of India with the foreign country, or in the interests of the general public."
Sub-section (5) requires the Passport Authority impounding or revoking a passport or travel document or varying or cancelling an endorsement made upon it to record in writing a brief statement of the reasons for making such order and furnish to the holder of the passport or travel document on demand a copy of the same, unless, in any case, the Passport Authority is of the opinion that it will not be in the interest of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of India, friendly relations of India with any foreign country, or in the interest of the general public to furnish such a copy. The Central Government declined to furnish a copy of this statement of reasons for impounding the passport of the petitioner on the ground that it was not in the interest of the general public to furnish such copy to the petitioner.
The petitioner contended.
1.The right to go abroad is part of "personal liberty" within the meaning of that expression as used in Art. 21 and no one can be deprived of this right except according to the procedure prescribed by law. There is no procedure prescribed by the Passport Act, for impounding or revoking a Passport. Even if some procedure can be traced in the said Act it is unreasonable and arbitrary in as much as it does not provide for giving an opportunity to the holder of the Passport to be heard against the making of the order.
2.Section 10(3) (c) is violative of fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14,19(1) (a) and (g) and 21.
3.The impugned order is made in contravention of the rules of natural justice and is, therefore, null and void. The impugned order has effect of placing an unreasonable restriction on the right of free speech and expression guaranteed to the petitioner under Article 19(1) (a) as also on the right to carry on the profession of a journalist conferred under Art. 19 (1) (g).
4. The impugned order could not consistently with Articles 19(1)(a) and (g)be passed on a mere information of the Central Government that the presence of the petitioner is likely to be required in connection with the proceedings before the Commission of Inquiry.
5.In order that a passport may be impounded under s. 10 (3) (c), public interest must actually exist in present and mere likelihood of public interest arising in future would be no ground for impounding the passport.
6. It was not correct to say that the petitioner was likely to be required for giving evidence before the Shah Commission.
The respondents denied the contentions raised by the petitioner.

Jurisdiction of the district forum

11. Jurisdiction of the district forum.
http://www.vakilno1.com/bareacts/consumerprotectionact/s11.htm
(1) Subject to other provisions of this Act, the District Forum shall have jurisdiction to entertain complaints where the value of the goods or services and the Compensation if any, claimed 1[does not exceed rupees twenty lakhs].

(2) A complaint shall be instituted in a District Forum within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, -

(a) The opposite party or each of the opposite parties, where there are more than one, at the time of the institution of the complaint, actually and voluntarily resides or 2[carries on business or has a branch office, or] personally works for gain; or

(b) Any of the opposite parties where there are more then one, at the time of the institution of the complaint, actually and voluntarily resides, or 2[carries on business or has a branch office], or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the permission of the District Forum is given, or the opposite parties who do not reside, or 2[carry on business or have a branch office], or personally works for gain, as the case may be, acquiesce in such institution; or

(c) The cause of action, wholly or in part arises.

1. Substituted by Act 50 of 1993, sec.9 for "is less than rupees one lakh"(w. e. f. 18-6-1993) and again subs. by Act 62 of 2002, sec. 7, for "does not exceed rupees five lakhs" (w. e. f. 15-3-2003)

2. Subs. by Act 50 of 1993, sec.9 for "carries on business or" (w. r. e. f. 18-6-1993).

Examination in chief

Examination in chief

http://www.legalserviceindia.com/article/l15-Examination-in-chief.html
I kept six honest serving men.
They taught me all I knew.
Their names were what and why and when
And how and where and who - - Rudyard Kipling

Introduction
It's been said, "A good lawyer turns evidence into fact and fact into truth." Because they bear the burden of proving the case beyond a reasonable doubt, prosecutors must call witnesses in every trial. Examination in Chief is the keystone in the prosecution's arch. It is also important to the defender who will call witnesses in support of the defensive theory. Direct examination is a vastly overlooked skill. Unlike cross-examination, there is very little written material to guide practitioners through the examination of their own witnesses. This is surprising because cases are actually won or lost on the fruits of direct examination.

Examination in Chief is one of the most subtle and sophisticated forms of advocacy. It is subtle because a good chief examination focuses entirely on the witness and their evidence. The evidence should appear to be flowing effortlessly from the witness. It should look easy. Whereas the witness should be memorable, the lawyer should not. Chief examination is sophisticated advocacy because during its course counsel is actually presenting their case, while trying to satisfy a multitude of objectives, such as maximizing the potential of each witness to present all relevant evidence in as logical, credible, persuasive and accurate manner as possible, while knitting all witnesses' evidence together in a coherent fashion in order to prove all the elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt. Examination in Chief thus becomes a starting point for any litigation. In the adversarial system of our country, it becomes a tool of extracting truth from the facts.

Hence it becomes quintessential at this juncture to define what “Examination in Chief” really means. Section 137 of the Indian Evidence Act defines the term “Examination in Chief.”

Examination in Chief-
The Examination of a witness by a party who calls him shall be called his examination in Chief. Examination in Chief is the first examination after the witness has been sworn or affirmed. It is a province of a party by whom the witness is called to examine him in chief for the purpose of eliciting from the witness all the material facts within his knowledge which tend to prove the party’s case. Examination in Chief is also known as Direct Examination.

Legalities involved in Examination in Chief.
a) A question based on supposition of fact not proved is improper.
b) Counsels are allowed to ask apparently irrelevant and consequentially inadmissible questions upon the promise to follow them up at the proper time by proof of other facts, which true, would make the question put legitimately operative.
c) The party examining a witness in chief is bound at his peril to ask all material questions in the first instance, and if he fails to do this, it cannot be done in reply.
d) If a question as to any material fact has been omitted upon the examination in Chief, the usual course is to suggest the question to the court which will exercise its discretion in putting it to the witnesses
e) There was no question of cross-examining the plaintiff travelling beyond the evidence of the plaintiff given in examination-in-chief and thereby giving an opportunity to make out a case in cross-examination
f) The corollary of it is that if a judge felt that a witness has committed an error or a slip it is the duty of the judge to ascertain whether it was so, for, to err is human n the truth and the chances of erring may accelerate under stress of nervousness during cross-examination.
g) But in exceptional circumstances there can be a cross examination of witnesses whose chief examination has been not been done.
h) But this situation is uncertain to quite an extent and there have been descending opinion regarding this.
i) On the examination-in-chief, a witness can only give evidence of facts within his own knowledge and recollection.
j) In all cases the facts from the examination in chief must be relevant. The answer must be upon a point of fact as opposed to point of law.
k) The conlusions of a witness as to the motives of other persons are inadmissible, motives being eminently inferences from conduct.
l) Leading questions may not ordinarily be put in examination in chief.
m) In cases where the witness proves to be hostile, he may be cross examined by the party calling him.
There are other legal provision of the Indian Evidence Act which are applicable here and are referred to in the later part of the project.

Objectives Of Examination In Chief
(1) Legally sufficient to meet the burden of proof, (2) understood and remembered, (3) convincing, (4) able to withstand cross-examination, and (5) anticipatory and contradictory of evidence that the opposition will present. Think of direct examination as your opportunity to construct persuasive arguments. The questions that will be asked shall subtly convey your argument. Conversely, use the arguments that you want to make at the end of the case to guide you in planning and preparing the questions you will ask on examination in chief.

(2) There are multiple objectives to examination in chief. The more significant are as follows:
A. Major Objectives
(a) the evidence must be admissible;
(b) the witness needs to present as persuasive and credible;
(c) each and every element of the offence must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt through the witnesses oral evidence and exhibits.

B. Minor Objectives
In addition, you are also trying to achieve the following slightly less essential, but still important, objectives:
(1) present a logical, complete and coherent theory of the offence;
(2) present each witness in the best possible light;
(3) use the evidence of one witness to support another so that a seamless cloth may be woven of the proven fact;
(4) fill in gaps in the evidence and attempt to explain any inconsistencies;
(5) shut down potential cross-examination thereby limiting the exposure of witnesses.
(6) allow the defence as little room to move as possible by minimizing the possibilities of a defence being supported through cross-examination of witnesses

Legal requirements for an examination in chief
Competency of your witness - The first legal requirement is that your witness must be competent to testify. To qualify as competent, a witness must have: (1) Understanding of the nature and obligation of the oath or affirmation to tell the truth, (2) Perception (knowledge) of the the relevant event, (3) Recollection (memory) of the relevant event, and (4) Ability to communicate

Relevance of your witness' testimony - The second legal requirement for your direct examination is that your witness' testimony must be relevant. Relevant evidence is evidence that has some (any) tendency; however slight, to make the existence of a fact of consequence to the case more or less probable than it would be without it.

Authenticity of matters of evidence to show that the item in question is what its proponent claims it is - The third requirement for your direct examination is that matters of evidence must be authenticated. You authenticate an item of evidence by making a prima facie showing that it is genuine.

Proper evidentiary foundation or predicate for the admissibility of the evidence - Certain items of evidence require special foundations to establish admissibility. For example, if your evidence is hearsay and, thus, presumptively inadmissible prima facie, but will be required to establish its admissibility under one of the hearsay exceptions.

Over and above this, the lawyer conducting examination in Chief must also be careful to stick to the legalities as mentioned above.

Lawyers’s Preparation For The Examination In Chief:
(A) Planning Ahead: What is the Witness’ Role?
1. The Theme of the Case.
2. The Order of Witnesses
3. What witness says

(B) Preparing the Witness.
1. Prior Testimony.
2. Current Testimony.
3. The Use of Documents to Refresh Recollection.
4. The Cross-Examination Drill.
5. The Rules of Evidence and the Need for Objections

(C) The Direct Examination:
1. Organizing the Direct.
2. The Form of the Question.
3. The Use of Non-Verbal Evidence.
4. To overcome with the mistakes that the witnesses have made.

Art Of Preparing A Structure For Examination In Chief:
1. Outline. The questions should be written in the lingo of the ear, not the eye. There needs to be a trial book maintained whose help needs to be taken. The entire process must look impressive and spontaneous to some extent. Maintaining eye contact is necessary.
2. Clarify. To make your questions clear, add only one new fact to each question. Compound questions invite objections. So do questions that are vague and ambiguous.
3. Build evidentiary bridges. There needs to be a connection between the witnesses one wants to present in the examination in chief. One needs to inter relate the witnesses to make it easy for the judges.
4. Employ transitions and signposts. There needs to be proper use of phrases to connect the matter in issue. Use of conjunction and transitions like “From here we move to” would help the judges understand the matter in a better way.
5. Make repetition persuasive. Repetition must be artful. There must be a repetition of things which are necessary. But such a repetition must be in such a way the opponent cannot object to the repetition.
6. Stretch the important parts. To dramatize a key point in examination in chief, learn how to "stretch-out" your questions. The things which are important should continue for a long time. At the same time, these aspects should remain fresh in the judges mind due to its prolonged nature of presentation.
7. Learn to mirror. Mirror some of the good characteristics of the witness. Adopting some of the characteristics of the witness, e.g., language, smile, tone of voice, eye-contact, etc. puts the lawyer on a better conversational level with his witness.
8. Have your foundations ready. Be prepared to authenticate and lay foundations for any exhibits that are going to be introduced to the witnesses. The goal should be smooth introduction of your tangible exhibits and a persuasive "tell and show" as you use the exhibits to add to the issue concerned.
9. Make your witness' personal knowledge clear. The non-expert witness must speak from personal knowledge. The lay witness can give lay opinion rationally based on the witness' personal perceptions. But a lay witness is not allowed to draw conclusions that call for technical, scientific, or other specialized knowledge.
10. Deflate the potential cross-examination. The examination in Chief must indirectly counter all the rebutting or all probably questions which may crop out of the cross examination. Hence one has to be cautious with the questions put forward.
12. Utilize open-ended questions for the important parts of the story. Questions starting with what, when, how, where etc are open ended questions. They help in giving a vivid description of the issue. And it also benefits the witness to answer at ease.
13. Avoid questions that suggest the answer to your witness. Leading questions should not be allowed to ask in the court, except for certain circumstances.

There are Golden Rules given by David Paul Brown for the Examination of witnesses: These golden rules alert the lawyer to ask questions according to the type of their witnesses. He has given several guidelines which a lawyer can follow for a worthwhile examination in Chief.

Dealing with the direct examination of a hostile witness, adverse party, or a person identified with an adverse party.
A hostile witness can be as unpredictable as a wild mustang stallion. If you don't rein him in, he can do more damage than good. The hostile witness can be asked leading questions with the permission of the court.

Critical Appraisal Of The System
The examination in Chief is one of the methods of finding truth from the facts. But this system has been corrupted to an extent that the witnesses have merely become puppets whose threads are with the lawyer.

Moreover since already discussed earlier examination in chief requires a lot of skill, hard work and art. A lawyer who may possess it shall be successful in his endeavor of reaching his aim. But in the entire scenario, what seems to be missing is the sense of justice involved. The technicalities involved and high pressure preparations quite often defeat the entire purpose of the activity, which was to reach the ends of justice.

Moreover the complicated justice system and even more complicated lawyers leave the witnesses baffled, confused, perplexed and lost. The advocate’s object is to elicit all the facts relevant to the case s/he is presenting. How far does the adversarial type of litigation helps the purpose is still something to be ascertained.

Conclusion
An examination in chief must appear fresh, interesting, flowing, and conversational. This sounds easy, but requires a lot of work, research and preparation. The importance of Examination in Chief must never be underestimated. .A strong direct examination is an important building block that can lead to the success at the trial. Direct examination does not exist in a vacuum. It must be part of a coherent story told inside and outside the courtroom.

Effective examination in chief builds on a solid case foundation, and establishes client credibility and judge empathy. Like any performance, it requires good preparation; with the lawyer listening to the client first and then teaching the client how best to present himself. Then, at trial, the lawyer has to get out of the way of the relationship between the jury and the client. Turning over responsibility to the client may seem unnatural, and is always uncomfortable, but it is the best way to accomplish the goals of examination in chief, and the ultimate goal of winning the case for your client. Thus the skill of extracting information form one’s own witness also requires a great amount of skill, labor, art, hard work.

What needs to be determined is the fact that not undermining the defects of the examination in chief, is there an alternative? Probably our country is not accustomed to the inquisitorial system. But at the same time, with the development of the alternative dispute resolution system like mediation, arbitration and negotiation, there can be things which can be incorporated in this system of rigorous truth finding mechanism.

Consumer Protection Act

Introduction
The year 1986 is a Magna Carta in the history of Consumerism. It was this year that witnessed the enactment of the Consumer Protection Act. The first ever legislation in India of its kind which solely aimed at the grief staken consumers who the victims of the unfair trade practices and substandard services rendered to them. The preamble to this Act reads as follows: An Act to provide for better protection of the interests of the consumers and to make provisions for the establishment of consumer councils and other authorities for the settlement of consumers disputes and for matter connected therewith. Thus the preamble to this Act makes the intention of the framers of this Act crystal clear . The setting up of the dispute redressal machinery was only to secure and enable speedy justice to the aggrieved consumers. The enactment of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, a milestone in the history of socio-economic legislation in India, has considerably consolidated the process of consumer protection and has given rise, during the past few years, to new consumer jurisprudence. The act introduced a three-tier quasi-judicial consumer disputes redressal mechanism at the district, state and national level for dispensing inexpensive and time-bound consumer justice. Though passed in 1986, its effective implementation started only in 1990 when the institutions envisaged under the act were established throughout the country, thereby enabling a large number of consumers and organisations to approach these forums for the redressal of their grievances.

The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 underwent some amendments. Among them the important and latest amendment is of 2002. So we can say that the Act is in focus to the needs of the time. With this introduction, let me explain my assignment topic i.e, State Commission under Consumer Protection Act.

1. Composition of the State Commission (Section 16)
Each State Commission shall consist of One President and two or more other members.

1.1 The President
The President shall be a person who is or has been a Judge of a High Court, appointed by the State Government. His appointment should be made in consultation with the Chief Justice of High Court.

1.2 Members
In the state commission there should be not less than two, and not more than such number of members, as may be prescribed, and one of whom shall be a woman.

1.2.1 Qualifications of members
The members should have the following qualifications in order to be a member in the state commission for consumer disputes redressel
(i) be not less than thirty-five years of age;
(ii) possess a bachelor's degree from a recognised university; and(iii) be persons of ability, integrity and standing, and have adequate knowledge and experience of at least ten years in dealing with problems relating to economics, law, commerce, accountancy, industry, public affairs or administration:

Provided that not more than fifty per cent. of the members shall be from amongst persons having a judicial background. Explanation.- For the purposes of this clause, the expression 'persons having judicial background'' shall mean persons having knowledge and experience for at least a period of ten years as a presiding officer at the district level court or any tribunal at equivalent level.

1.2.2 Disqualifications of Members (Section 16(1))
A new proviso has been added to Section 16(1), by the Consumer Protection Amendment Act, 2002. They are as following
(a) has been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for an offence which, in the opinion of the State Government, involves moral turpitude; or
(b) is an undischarged insolvent; or
(c) is of unsound mind and stands so declared by a competent court; or
(d) has been removed or dismissed from the service of the Government or a body corporate owned or controlled by the Government; or
(e) has, in the opinion of the State Government, such financial or other
interest, as is likely to affect prejudicially the discharge by him of his functions as a member; or
(f) has such other disqualifications as may be prescribed by the State Government.

1.2.3 Selection committee for appointment of members (Sec.16 (1A))
Every appointment under sub-section (1) shall be made by the State Government on the recommendation of a Selection Committee consisting of the following members, namely:
(i) President of the State Commission........... Chairman;
(ii) Secretary of the Law Department of the State ....Member;
(iii) Secretary incharge of the Department dealing with Consumer Affairs in the State..... Member:

Provided that where the President of the State Commission is, by reason of absence or otherwise, unable to act as Chairman of the Selection Committee, the State Government may refer the matter to the Chief Justice of the High Court for nominating a sitting Judge of that High Court to act as Chairman.

1.2.4 Term of Office (Section 16 (3))
Every member of the State Commission shall hold office for a term of five years or up to the age of sixty-seven years, whichever is earlier: Provided that a member shall be eligible for re-appointment for another term of five years or up to the age of sixty-seven years, whichever is earlier, subject to the condition that he fulfills the qualifications and other conditions for appointment mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (1) and such re-appointment is made on the basis of the recommendation of the Selection Committee. Provided further that a person appointed as a President of the State Commission shall also be eligible for re-appointment in the manner provided in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of this section.

A member may resign his office in writing under his hand addressed to the State Government and on such resignation being accepted, his office shall become vacant and may be filled by appointment of a person possessing any of the qualifications mentioned in sub-section (1) in relation to the category of the member who is required to be appointed under the provisions of sub-section (1A) in place of the person who has resigned.

2 Jurisdiction of the State Commission
Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the State Commission shall have jurisdiction

2.1 Pecuniary Jurisdiction
Complaints where the value of the goods or services and compensation, if any, claimed exceeds rupees twenty lakhs but does not exceed rupees one crore, then it comes under the pecuniary jurisdiction of State Commission.

It may be noted that prior to amendment the pecuniary jurisdiction of state commission was upto 20 lakhs. By the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 2002, the jurisdiction of the State Commission has been increased to Rs. 1 Crore. The change is likely to be beneficial to the consumer. It will reduce the number of complaints to the National Commission.

2.2 Territorial Jurisdiction
A complaint shall be instituted in a State Commission within the limits of whose jurisdiction:
(a) the opposite party or each of the opposite parties, where there are more than one, at the time of the institution of the complaint, actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business or has a branch office or personally works for gain; or
(b) any of the opposite parties, where there are more than one, at the time of the institution of the complaint, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business or has a branch office or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the permission of the State Commission is given or the opposite parties who do not reside or carry on business or have a branch office or personally work for gain, as the case may be, acquiesce in such institution; or
(c) the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.

2.3 Appellate Jurisdiction (Section 15)
Section 15 of the Act gives the right to prefer an appeal to the state commission within a period of thirty days from the date of order of the District Forum to any person who has been aggrieved by the order. The time limit may be extended by the state commission on showing sufficient cause.

The person making an appeal should deposit 50% of the decreed amount or Rs.25000/- whichever is less. This requirement has been introduced by the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 2002.

3. Transfer of cases (Section 17 A)
This section is also inserted by the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 2002. This section enables the State Commission to transfer a Case from one District Forum to another within the state. On the application of a complaint or of its own motion, the State Commission may, at any stage of the proceeding, transfer any complaint pending before the District Forum to another District Forum within the State if the interest of justice so requires.

4. Circuit Benches (Section 17 B)
This is a new provision inserted in the Act by the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 2002. Section 17 B, provides for establishment of Circuit Benches of State Commission. The State Commission shall ordinarily function in the State Capital but may perform its functions at such other place as the State Government may, in consultation with the State Commission, notify in the Official Gazette, from time to time.

5. Expeditious hearing of appeal (Section 19 A)
A new section, 19A, has been inserted by the consumer protection (Amendment) Act, 2002. It provides that endeavour shall be made to dispose of appeals filed before the State Commission or the National Commission within ninety days from the date of admission. It provided for expeditious hearing of appeal, quicker decision and restriction of adjournment.

Conclusion
The scope of the Consumer Protection Act is widening in the society which is pro to globalization, industrialization and Privatization. So the Legislature has taken all the possible steps by making timely amendments to the Act in accordance with the needs of time. In fact all the amendments made to the Consumer Protection Act by the 2002 Amendments aim at furthering the efficiency of the Act and doing away with procedural delays which render the consumers disillusioned and dissatisfied. These Amendments have been fruitful in providing protection to the consumers in the real sense of the term and served the purpose of the Act. It is hoped that further amendments would aim at even more efficiency and render the position of the consumers much stronger in this era of globalization and privatization where the sudden unchecked advent of Multi National Companies has to be balanced with the protection of the rights of the consumers by the legislature and the judiciary.

SC guidelines for police procedure for arrest custody-D K basu vs state of west bengal

SC guidelines for police procedure for arrest custody-D K basu vs state of west bengal

subject-
Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 21, 22 and 32.
Custodial violence-Torture, rape and death in police custody/lock-up-
Infringes Art. 21 as well as basic human rights and strikes a blow at rule
of law-Torture involved not only physical suffering but also mental agony-
It was naked violation of human dignity and destruction of human per-
sonality-interrogation must be sustained and scientific-Third-degree
methods would be impermissible-Balanced approach needed to meet ends of
justice so that criminals did not go scot-free-Custodial deaths was one of
the worst crimes in civilised society-Transparency of action and account-
ability were two safe-guards to check abuse of police power-State terrorism
was no answer to terrorism-Victim of custodial violence and in case of his
death in custody, his family members entitled to compensation under public
law in addition to remedy available under private law for damages for
tortious act of police personnel-Mandatory `requirements' issued by Supreme
Court shall be complied with by police personnel while arresting or
detaining any person-These were in addition to constitutional and statutory
direc-tions-The requirements would apply with equal force to all
governmental agencies-The requirements must be circulated to all police
stations and publicised through mass media-Failure to comply with the
requirements would render the official concerned liable for departmental
action as well as contempt of court-Proceedings for contempt of court could
be instituted in High Court having territorial jurisdiction-Penal Code,
1860, Ss. 220, 330 and 331.
Fundamental Rights-Established invasion of-Compensation for-Held :
Compensation could be awarded under public law by Supreme Court and by High
Courts in addition to traditional remedies under private law for tortious
acts and punishment to wrongdoer under criminal law.
Public law proceedings-Object of-Held : Different from private law
proceedings-Award of compensation in public law proceedings, in a given
case, could be adjusted against damages awarded in a civil suit.
The petitioner filed a petition-public interest-in this Court in the wake
of news items published in the Telegraph, the Statesman and the Indian
Express regarding deaths in police lock-up and custody. The petition stated
that efforts were often made to hush up the lock-up deaths and thus the
crime went unpunished and "flourished".
On behalf of the petitioner it was submitted that modalities for awarding
compensation to the victim and/or family members of the victim for
attrocities and death caused in police custody and to provide for
accountability of the officers concerned be formulated.
---------------
Held notes -
Disposing of the petition, this Court
HELD : 1.1. Custodial violence, including torture and death in the lock
ups, strikes a blow at the Rule of Law, which demands that the powers of
the executive should not only be derived from law but also that the same
should be limited by law. Custodial violence is a matter of concern. It is
aggravated by the fact that it is committed by persons who are supposed to
be the protectors of the citizens. It is committed under the shield of
uniform and authority within the four walls of a police station or lock-up,
the victim being totally helpless. The protection of an individual from
torture and abuse by the police and other law enforcing officers is a
matter of deep concern in a free society. These petitions raise important
issues concerning police powers, including whether monetary compensation
should be awarded for established infringement of the Fundamental Rights
guaranteed by Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. The issues
are fundamental. [295-C-E]
1.2. `Torture' of a human being by another human being is essentially an
instrument to impose the will of the `strong' over the `weak' by suffering.
The word torture today has become synoymous with the darker side of human
civilisation. "Custodial torture" is a naked violation of human dig-nity
and degradation which destroys, to a very large extent, the individual
personality. It is a calculated assault on human dignity and whenever human
dignity is wounded, civilisation takes a step backward- flag of humanity
must on each such occasion fly half- mast. In all custodial crimes what is
of real concern is not only infliction of body pain but the mental agony
which a person undergoes within the four walls of police station or lock-
up. Whether it is physical assault or rape in police custody, the extent of
trauma, a person experiences is beyond the purview of law. [295-F; 296-B-C]
1.3. Custodial death is perhaps one of the worst crimes in civilised
society governed by the Rule of Law. The rights inherent in Articles 21 and
22(1) of the Constitution require to be jealously and scrupulously
protected. The expression "life or personal liberty" has been held to
include the right to live with human dignity and thus it would also include
within itself a guarantee against torture and assault by the State or its
functionaries. The precious right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitu-
tion of India cannot be denied to convicts, undertrials, detenues and other
prisoners in custody, except according to the procedure established by law
by placing such reasonable restrictions as are permitted by law. It cannot
be said that a citizen sheds off his fundamental right to life, the moment
a policeman arrests him. Nor can it be said that the right to life of a
citizen be put in abeyance on his arrest. Any form of torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment would fall within the inhibition of Article
21 of the Constitution, whether it occurs during investigation,
interrogation or otherwise. If the functionaries of the Government become
law breakers, it is bound to breed contempt for law and would encourage
lawlessness and every man would have the tendency to become law unto
himself thereby leading to anarchism. No civilised nation can permit that
to happen. This Court as the custodian and protector of the fundamental and
the basic human rights of the citizens cannot wish away the problem. The
right to interrogate the detenues, culprits or arrestees in the interest of
the nation, must take precedence over an individual's right to personal
liberty. The latin maxim salus papule est suprema lex (the safety of the
people is the Supreme law) and sallus republicae est suprema lex (safety of
the State is the supreme law) co-exist and are not only important and
relevant but lie at the heart of the doctrine that the welfare of an
individual must yield to that of the community. The action of the State,
however, must be "right, just and fair". Using any form of torture for
extracting any kind of infor-mation would neither be `right nor just and
fair' and, therefore, would be impermissible, being offensive to Article
21. Such a crime-suspect must be interrogated - indeed subjected to
sustained and scientific interrogation -determined in accordance with the
provisions of law. He cannot, however, be tortured or subjected to third
degree methods or eliminated with a view to elicit information, extract
confession or derive knowledge about his accomplices, weapons etc. His
Constitutional right cannot be abridged except in the manner permitted by
law, though in the very nature of things there would be qualitative
difference in the method of interrogation of such a person as compared to
an ordinary criminal. Challenge of terrorism must be met with innovative
ideas and approach. State terrorism is no answer to combat terrorism. State
terrorism would only provide legitimacy to `terrorism'. That would be bad
for the State, community and above all for the Rule of Law. The State must,
therefore, ensure that various agencies deployed by it for combating
terrorism act within the bounds of law and not become law unto themselves.
That the terrorist has violated human rights of innocent citizens may
render him liable for punishment but it cannot justify the violation of his
human rights except in the manner permitted by law. Need, therefore, is to
develop scientific methods of investigation and train the investigators
properly to interrogate to meet the challenge. [301-F-G; 298-B-C; 302-A-B;
301-G-H; 309-D-F; 310-A-B]
Joginder Kumar v. State, [1994] 4 SCC 260; Neelabati Bahera v. State of
Orissa, [1993] 2 SCC 746 and State of M.P. v. Shyamsunder Triwedi & Ors.,
[1995] 3 Scale 343, relied on.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, referred to. Chambers v. Florida, 309 US
227, cited.
2.1. Police is, no doubt, under a legal duty and has legitimate right to
arrest a criminal and to interrogate him during the investigation of an
offence but it must be remembered that the law does nor permit use of third
degree methods or torture of accused in custody during interrogation and
investigation with a view to solve the crime. End cannot justify the means.
The interrogation and investigation into a crime should be in true sense
purposeful to make the investigation effective. By torturing a person and
using third degree methods, the police would be accomplishing behind the
closed doors what the demands of our legal order forbid. No society can
permit it. [307-B-D]
2.2. It is true that in case of "too much" emphasis on protection of
fundamental and human rights of hardened criminals, such criminals may go
scot-free without exposing any element or iota of criminality with the
result, the crime would go unpunished and in the ultimate analysis the
society would suffer. The concern is genuine and the problem is real. To
deal with such a situation, a balanced approach is needed to meet the ends
of justice. This is all the more so, in view of the expectation of the
society that police must deal with the criminals in an efficient and
effective manner and bring to book those who are involved in the crime. The
cure cannot, however, be worse than the disease itself. [308-F-G]
2.3. To check the abuse of police power, transparency of action and
accountability perhaps are two possible safeguards which this Court must
insist upon. Attention is also required to be paid to properly develop work
culture, training and orientation of the police force consistent with basic
human values. Training methodology of the police needs restructuring. The
force needs to be infused with basic human values and made sensitive to the
constitutional ethos. Efforts must be made to change the attitude and
approach of the police personnel handling investigation so that they do not
sacrifice basic human values during interrogation and do not resort to
questionable forms of interrogation. With a view to bring in transparen-cy,
the presence of the counsel of the arrestee at some point of time during
the interrogation may deter the police from using third degree methods
during interrogation.
3. It is, therefore, appropriate to issue the following requirements to be
followed in all cases of arrest or detention till legal provisions are made
in that behalf as preventive measures :
(1)  The police personnel carrying out the arrest and handling the
interrogation of the arrestee should bear accurate, visible and clear iden-
tification and name tags with their designations. The particulars of all
such police personnel who handle interrogation of the arrestee must be
recorded in a register.
(2) That the police officer carrying out the arrest of the arrestee shall
prepare a memo of arrest at the time of arrest and such memo shall be
attested by at least one witness, who may be either a member of the family
of the arrestee or a respectable person of the locality from where the
arrest is made. It shall also be countersigned by the arrestee and shall
contain the time and date of arrest.
(3) A person who has been arrested or detained and is being held in custody
in a police station or interrogation centre or other lock-up, shall be
entitled to have one friend or relative or other person known to him or
having interest in his welfare being informed, as soon as practicable, that
he has been arrested and is being detained at the particular place, unless
the attesting witness of the memo of arrest is himself such a friend or a
relative of the arrestee.
(4) The time, place of arrest and venue of custody of an arrestee must be
notified by the police where the next friend or relative of the arrestee
lives outside the district or town through the Legal Aid Organisation in
the District and the police station of the area concerned telegraphically
within a period of 8 to 12 hours after the arrest.
(5)  The person arrested must be made aware of this right to have someone
informed of his arrest or detention as soon as he is put under arrest or is
detained.
(6)  An entry must be made in the diary at the place of detention regarding
the arrest of the person which shall also disclose the name of the next
friend of the person who has been informed of the arrest and the names and
particulars of the police officials in whose custody the arrestee is.
(7)  The arrestee should, where he so requests, be also examined at the
time of his arrest and major and minor injuries, if any present on his/her
body, must be recorded at that time. The "Inspection Memo" must be signed
both by the arrestee and the police officer effecting the arrest and its
copy provided to the arrestee.
(8)  The arrestee should be subjected to medical examination by a trained
doctor every 48 hours during his detention in custody by a doctor on the
panel of approved doctors appointed by Director, Health Services of the
concerned State or Union Territory. Director, Health Services should
prepare such a penal for all Tehsils and Districts as well.
(9)  Copies of all the documents including the memo of arrest, referred to
above, should be sent to the illaqa Magistrate for his record.
(10) The arrestee may be permitted to meet his lawyer during inter-
rogation, though not throughout the interrogation.
(11) A police control room should be provided at all district and state
headquarters, where information regarding the arrest and the place of
custody of the arrestee shall be communicated by the officer causing the
arrest, within 12 hours of effecting the arrest and at the police control
room it should be displayed on a conspicuous notice board. [310-D-F; 311-A-
H; 312-A]
4.1. Failure to comply with the requirements hereinabove mentioned shall
apart from rendering the concerned official liable for departmental action,
also render him liable to be punished for contempt of court and the
proceedings for contempt of court may be instituted in High Court of the
country, having territorial jurisdiction over the matter. [312-B]
4.2. The requirements, referred to above flow from Articles 21 and 22 (1)
of the Constitution and need to be strictly followed. These would apply
with equal force to the other Governmental agencies also like Directorate
of Revenue Intelligence, Directorate of Enforcement, Coastal Guard, Central
Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Border Security Force (BSF), the Central In-
dustrial Security Force (CISF), the State Armed Police, Intelligence
Agencies like the Intelligence Bureau, RAW, Central Bureau of Investigation
(CBI), CID, Traffic Police, Mounted Police and ITBP. [307-G-H; 308-A-B]
Re Death of Satwinder Singh Graver [1995] Supp. 4 SCC 450, relied on.
4.3.  These requirements are in addition to the constitutional and
statutory safeguards and do not detract from various other directions given
by the courts from time to time in connection with the safeguarding of the
rights and dignity of the arrestee. [312-C-D]
4.4. The requirements mentioned above shall be forwarded to the Director
General of Police and the Home Secretary of every State/Union Territory and
it shall be their obligation to circulate the same to every police station
under their charge and get the same notified at every police station at a
conspicuous place. It would also be useful and serve larger interest to
broadcast the requirements on the All India Radio besides being shown on
the National network of Doordarshan and by publishing and distributing
pamphlets in the local language containing these requirements for
information of the general public. Creating awareness about the rights of
the arrestee would be a step in the rights direction to combat the evil of
custodial crime and bring in transparency and ccountability. [312-D-F]
5.1. UBI JUS IBI REMEDIUM - There is no wrong without a remedy. The law
wills that in every case where a man is wronged and endamaged he must have
a remedy. A mere declaration of invalidity of an action or finding of
custodial violence or death in lock-up, does not by itself provide any
meaningful remedy to a person whose fundamental right to life has been
infringed. Much more needs to be done. There is indeed no express provision
in the Constitution of India for grant of compensation for violation of a
fundamental right to life, nonetheless, this Court has judi-cially evolved
a right to compensation in cases of established unconstitu-tional
deprivation of personal liberty or life. [312-G-H; 313-A; H; 314-A]
Rudul Shah v. State of Bihar [1983] 4 SCC 141; Sebastian M. Hongrey v.
Union of India [1984] 3 SCC 339; Bhim Singh v. State of J & K [1984] Supp.
SCC 504; Saheli v. Commissioner of Police, Delhi [1990] 1 SCC 422 and
Kasturi Lal Ralia Ram Jain v. State of U.P. [1965] 1 S.C.R. 375, relied on.
52. The claim in public law for compensation for unconstitutional
deprivation of fundamental right to life and liberty, the protection of
which is guaranteed under the Constitution, is a claim based on strict
liability and is in addition to the claim available in private law for
damages for tortious acts of the public servants. Public law proceedings
serve a dif-ferent purpose than the private law proceedings. Award of
compensation for established infringement of the indefeasible rights
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution is a remedy available in
public law since the purpose of public law is not only to civilise public
power but also to assure the citizens that they live under a legal system
wherein their rights and interests shall be protected and preserved. Grant
of compensation in proceedings under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution
of India for the established violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed
under Article 21, is an exercise of the Courts under the public law
jurisdiction for penalising the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the
public wrong on the State which failed in the discharge of its public duty
to protect the fundamental rights of the citizen. [314-H; 315-A-C]
5.3. The old doctrine of only relegating the aggrieved to the remedies
available in civil law limits the role of the courts too much, as the
protector and custodian of the indefeasible rights of the citizens. The
courts have the obligation to satisfy the social aspirations of the
citizens because the courts and the law are for the people and expected to
respond to their aspirations. A court of law cannot close its consciousness
and aliveness to stark realities. Mere punishment of the offender cannot
give much solace to the family of the victim - civil action for damages is
a long drawn and cumbersome judicial process. Monetary compensation for
redressal by the Court finding the infringement of the indefeasible right
to life of the citizen is, therefore, a useful and at times perhaps the
only effective remedy to apply balm to the wounds of the family members of
the deceased victim, who may have been the bread winner of the family.
[315-D-F]
Nilabti Behera v. State of Orissa [1993] 2 SCC 746, relied on.
The State (At the Prosecution of Quinn) v. Ryan (1965) IR 70; Byrne v.
Ireland (1972) IR 241; Maharaj v. Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago
(1978) 2 All E.R. 670 and Simpson v. Attorney General (1994) NZIR 667,
referred to.
6. Awarding appropriate punishment for the offence (irrespective of
compensation) must be left to the criminal courts in which the offender is
prosecuted, which the state, in law, is duly bound to do. The award of
compensation in the public law jurisdiction is also without prejudice to
any other action like civil suit for damages which is lawfully available to
the victim or the heirs of the deceased victim with respect to the same
matter for the tortious act committed by the functionaries of the State.
The quantum of compensation will, of course, depend upon the peculiar facts
of each case and no strait jacket formula can be evolved in that behalf.
The relief to redress the wrong for the established invasion of the fun-
damental rights of the citizen, under the public law jurisdiction is, thus,
in addition to the traditional remedies and not in derogation of them. The
amount of compensation as awarded by the Court and paid by the State to
redress the wrong done, may in a given case, be adjusted against any amount
which may be awarded to the claimant by way of damages in a civil suit
[320-C-F]
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 539 of 1986 Etc.
---------
citation -1997 AIR  610, 1996(10  )Suppl.SCR 284, 1997( 1  )SCC 416, 1996( 9  )SCALE298 , 1997( 1  )JT   1

--------
PETITIONER:
SHRI D.K. BASU,ASHOK K. JOHRI
    Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF WEST BENGAL,STATE OF U.P.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:    18/12/1996
BENCH:
KULDIP SINGH, A.S. ANAND
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
                WITH
WRIT PETITION (CRL) NO. 592 OF 1987
              J U D G M E N T
DR. ANAND, J.
     The  Executive   Chairman,     Legal    Aid  Services,    West
Bengal, a  non-political organisation  registered under     the
Societies Registration Act, on 26th August, 1986 addressed a
letter to  the Chief  Justice of India drawing his attention
to certain  news items    published in the Telegraph dated 20,
21 and    22 of  July, 1986  and in  the Statesman  and  India
express dated  17th August,  1986 regarding deaths in police
lock-ups  and    custody.  The    Executive   Chairman   after
reproducing the     new items  submitted that it was imperative
to examine  the issue  in  depth  and  to  develop  "custody
jurisprudence"    and   formulate     modalities   for   awarding
compensation to     the victim  and/or family  members  of     the
victim for  attrocities and  death caused  in police custody
and to    provide for  accountability of the efforts are often
made to     hush up  the matter  of lock-up deaths and thus the
crime goes  unpunished and  "flourishes". It  was  requested
that the   letter  alongwith the  new items  be treated as a
writ petition under "public interest litigation" category.
     Considering the  importance of  the issue raised in the
letter being  concerned     by  frequent  complaints  regarding
custodial violence  and deaths in police lock up, the letter
was treated  as a  writ petition  and notice  was issued  on
9.2.1987 to the respondents.
     In response  to the  notice, the  State of     West Bengal
filed a     counter. It  was maintained  that the police was no
hushing up  any matter    of lock-up  death and that whereever
police personnel  were found  to  be  responsible  for    such
death,    action     was  being   initiated     against  them.     The
respondents characterised the writ petition as misconceived,
misleading and untenable in law.
     While the    writ  petition    was  under  consideration  a
letter addressed by Shri Ashok Kumar Johri on 29.7.87 to the
Hon'ble Chief Justice of India drawing the attention of this
Court to the death of one Mahesh Bihari of Pilkhana, Aligarh
in police custody was received. That letter was also treated
as a  writ petition  and was directed to be listed alongwith
the writ petition filed by Shri D.K. Basu. On 14.8.1987 this
Court made the following order :
     "In almost     every states  there are
     allegations and  these  allegations
     are now  increasing in frequency of
     deaths   in    custody    described
     generally by  newspapers as lock-up
     deaths. At     present there    does not
     appear  to      be  any  machinery  to
     effectively    deal    with    such
     allegations. Since     this is  an all
     India   question    concerning   all
     States, it     is desirable  to issues
     notices   to    all    the       State
     Governments  to  find  out     whether
     they are  desire to say anything in
     the matter.  Let notices  issue  to
     all  the    State  Governments.  Let
     notice  also   issue  to    the  Law
     Commission of  India with a request
     that suitable  suggestions     may  be
     returnable     in   two  months   from
     today."
     In response  to the  notice, affidavits have been filed
on behalf  of the  States  of  West  Bengal,  Orissa,  Assam
Himachal Pradesh,  Madhya  Pradesh,  Harayana,    Tamil  Nadu,
Meghalaya ,  Maharashtra and  Manipur. Affidavits  have also
been filed  on behalf  of Union     Territory of Chandigarh and
the Law Commission of India.
     During the course of hearing of the writ petitions, the
Court felt  necessity of  having assistance from the Bar and
Dr. A.M.  Singhvi, senior  advocate was     requested to assist
the Court as amicus curiae.
     Learned counsel  appearing for different States and Dr.
Singhvi, as  a friend  of the court. presented the case ably
and though  the effort    on the    part of the States initially
was  to      show    that  "everything  was    well"  within  their
respective States,  learned counsel  for the parties, as was
expected of  them in  view of  the importance  of the  issue
involved, rose    above their  respective briefs    and rendered
useful assistance  to this Court in examining various facets
of the issue and made certain suggestions for formulation of
guidelines by  this  court  to    minimise,  if  not  prevent,
custodial violence  and kith  and kin  of those     who die  in
custody on account of torture.
     The Law  Commission of  India also     in response  to the
notice issued  by this    Court forwarded     a copy of the 113th
Report regarding  "injuries in    police custody and suggested
incorporation of Section 114-B in the India Evidence Act."
     The importance  of affirmed rights of every human being
need no     emphasis and,    therefore, to deter breaches thereof
becomes a  sacred duty    of the    Court, as  the custodian and
protector of  the fundamental  and the basic human rights of
the citizens.  Custodial  violence,  including    torture     and
death in  the lock  ups, strikes  a blow at the Rule of Law,
which demands  that the     powers of  the executive should not
only be     derived from  law but    also that the same should be
limited by  law. Custodial  violence is a matter of concern.
It is aggravated by the fact that it is committed by persons
who are supposed to be the protectors of the citizens. It is
committed under     the shield  of uniform and authority in the
four walls  of a police station or lock-up, the victim being
totally helpless.  The    protection  of    an  individual    from
torture and  abuse by  the police  and other  law  enforcing
officers is  a matter  of deep    concern in  a free  society.
These petitions     raise important  issues  concerning  police
powers, including  whether monetary  compensation should  be
awarded for  established  infringement    of  the     Fundamental
Rights guaranteed  by Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution
of India. The issues are fundamental.
     "Torture" has  not been  defined in  Constitution or in
other penal  laws. 'Torture'  of a  human being     by  another
human being  is essentially an instrument to impose the will
of the    'strong' over  the 'weak'  by  suffering.  The    word
torture today  has become  synonymous wit the darker side of
human civilisation.
     "Torture is  a wound in the soul so
     painful  that   sometimes    you  can
     almost touch  it, but it is also so
     intangible that there is not way to
     heal   it.      Torture   is     anguish
     squeezing in  your chest,    cold  as
     ice and heavy as a stone paralyzing
     as sleep  and dark     as  the  abyss.
     Torture is     despair  and  fear  and
     rage and  hate. It     is a  desire to
     kill    and    destroy    including
     yourself."
     Adriana P. Bartow
     No violation  of any  one of  the human rights has been
the subject  of so  many  Conventions  and  Declarations  as
'torture'- all    aiming at  total banning of it in all forms,
but inspite  of the  commitments made  to eliminate torture,
the fact  remains that    torture is  more widespread not that
ever before,  "Custodial torture"  is a     naked violation  of
human dignity and degradation with destroys, to a very large
extent, the  individual     personality.  IT  is  a  calculated
assault on  human dignity  and    whenever  human     dignity  is
wounded, civilisation takes a step backward-flag of humanity
must on each such occasion fly half-mast.
     In all  custodial crimes that is of real concern is not
only infliction     of body  pain but  the mental agony which a
person undergoes  within the four walls of police station or
lock-up. Whether  it is     physical assault  or rape in police
custody, the extent of trauma a person experiences is beyond
the purview of law.
     "Custodial violence"  and abuse  of police power is not
only peculiar  to this country, but it is widespread. It has
been the  concern of  international  community    because     the
problem is universal and the challenge is almost global. The
Universal Declaration  of Human Rights in 1984, which market
the emergency of worldwide trend of protection and guarantee
of certain  basic human rights, stipulates in Article 5 that
"No one     shall be  subjected to torture or to curel, inhuman
or degrading  treatment or  punishment." Despite  the  pious
declaration, the  crime     continues  unabated,  though  every
civilised nation  shows its  concern and takes steps for its
eradication.
     In England,  torture was  once  regarded  as  a  normal
practice  to   ger  information     regarding  the     crime,     the
accomplices and the case property or to extract confessions,
but with  the development  of common  law and  more  radical
ideas imbibing    human  though  and  approach,  such  inhuman
practices were    initially discouraged  and eventually almost
done  away   with  ,  certain  aberrations  here  and  there
notwithstanding. The  police powers of arrest, detention and
interrogation in England were examined in depth by Sir Cyril
Philips Committee- 'Report of a Royal Commission on Criminal
Procedure' (command - Paper 8092 of 1981). The report of the
Royal Commission  is, instructive. In regard to the power of
arrest, the  Report recommended     that the  power  to  arrest
without a  warrant must     be related  to and  limited by     the
object to  be served  by the  arrest, namely, to prevent the
suspect     from    destroying  evidence   or  interfering    with
witnesses or  warning accomplices  who    have  not  yet    been
arrested or  where there  is a    good reason  to suspect     the
repetition of the offence and not to every case irrespective
of the object sought to be achieved.
     The Royal    Commission suggested certain restrictions on
the  power   of     arrest     on  the  basis     of  the  `necessity
principle'. The Royal commission said :
     ".... We  recommend that  detention
     upon arrest  for a     offence  should
     continue only on one or more of the
     following criteria :
     (a)  the  person`s`s  unwillingness
     to identify himself so that summons
     may be served upon him;
     (b)  the  need   to   prevent   the
     continuation or  repetition of that
     offence;
     (c)  the  need   to   protect   the
     arrested person`s    himself or other
     persons or property;
     (d)  the need to secure or preserve
     evidence of  or  relating    to  that
     offence or     to obtain such evidence
     from  the    suspect     by  questioning
     him; and
     (e)  the likelihood of the person`s
     failing  to   appear  at  court  to
     answer anycharge made against him."
     The Royal Commission also suggested
     :
     "To  help    to  reduce  the     use  of
     arrest we    would also  propose  the
     introduction here    of a scheme that
     is     used    in  Ontario  enabling  a
     police officer  to     issue    what  is
     called an    appearance notice.  That
     procedure can  be    used  to  obtain
     attendance at  the police     station
     without   resorting    to      arrest
     provided a     power to arrest exists,
     for example to be finger printed or
     to participate in an identification
     parade. It     could also  be extended
     to attendance  for interview  at  a
     time convenient both to the suspect
     and   to     the   police     officer
     investigating the case...."
     The power    of arrest,  interrogation and  detention has
now  been  streamlined    in  England  on     the  basis  of     the
suggestions made by the Royal Commission and incorporated in
police and  Criminal Evidence Act, 1984 and the incidence of
custodial violence  has been minimised there to a very great
extent.
     Fundamental rights occupy a place of pride in the India
Constitution.  Article    21  provides  "no  person  shall  be
deprived of his life or personal liberty expect according to
procedure established  by law". Personal liberty, thus, is a
sacred and  cherished  right  under  the  Constitution.     The
expression "life  of personal  liberty"     has  been  held  to
include the  right to  live with  human dignity     and thus it
would also include within itself a guarantee against torture
and assault  by the  State or  its functionaries. Article 22
guarantees  protection     against  arrest  and  detention  in
certain cases  and declares  that no  person who is arrested
shall be  detained in  custody without being informed of the
grounds of such arrest and the shall not be denied the right
to consult and defend himself by a legal practitioner of his
choice. Clause    (2) of    Article 22  directs that  the person
arrested and  detained in  custody shall  be produced before
the nearest  Magistrate within    a period of 24 hours of such
arrest, excluding  the time  necessary for  the journey from
the place  of arrest to the court of the Magistrate. Article
20(3) of the Constitution lays down that a person accused of
an offence  shall not  be compelled  to be a witness against
himself. These    are some  of  the  constitutional  safeguard
provided to  a person  with a  view to    protect his personal
liberty against     and unjustified  assault by  the State,  In
tune with  the constitutional  guarantee a  number statutory
provisions also     seek to  project personal  liberty, dignity
and basic  human rights     of  the  citizens.  Chapter  V.  of
Criminal Procedure  Code, 1973    deals  with  the  powers  of
arrest of  a person  and the safeguard which are required to
be followed  by the  police to    protect the  interest of the
arrested person.  Section 41, Cr. P.C. confers powers on any
police officer    to arrest  a person  under the circumstances
specified therein  without any    order or a warrant of arrest
from a Magistrate. Section 46 provides the method and manner
of arrest.  Under this    Section no  formality  is  necessary
while arresting     a person.  Under Section  49, the police is
not permitted  to use  more restraint  than is    necessary to
permitted to use more restraint than is necessary to prevent
the escape  of the  person. Section  50 enjoins every police
officer arresting  any person without warrant to communicate
to him    the full  particulars of the offence for which he is
arrested and the grounds for such arrest. The police officer
is further enjoined to inform the person arrested that he is
entitled to  be released  on bail  and he  may    arrange     for
sureties in  the event    of his    arrest    for  a    non-bailable
offence. Section 56 contains a mandatory provision requiring
the police  officer making  an    arrest    without     warrant  to
produce the  arrested person  before  a     Magistrate  without
unnecessary delay  and    Section     57  echoes  Clause  (2)  of
Article 22 of the Constituion of India. There are some other
provisions also     like Section 53, 54 and 167 which are aimed
at affording  procedural safeguards  to a person arrested by
the police. Whenever a person dies in custody of the police,
Section 176 requires the Magistrate to hold and enquiry into
the cause of death.
     However, inspite  of the  constitutional and  statutory
provisions aimed  at safeguarding  the personal     liberty and
life of     a citizen,  growing incidence of torture and deaths
in police  custody has    been a disturbing factor. Experience
shows that  worst violations  of  human     rights     take  place
during the  course of  investigation, when the police with a
view to secure evidence or confession often resorts to third
degree methods    including torture  and adopts  techniques of
screening arrest  by either  not   recording the  arrest  or
describing the    deprivation of liberty merely as a prolonged
interrogation. A  reading of  the morning  newspapers almost
everyday carrying  reports of dehumanising torture, assault,
rape and  death in  custody of    police or other governmental
agencies is  indeed depressing.     The increasing incidence of
torture and  death in  custody    has  assumed  such  alarming
proportions that  it is     affecting the    creditibility of the
Rule of     Law and  the  administration  of  criminal  justice
system. The community rightly feels perturbed. Society's cry
for justice becomes louder.
     The Third    Report of  the National Police Commission in
India expressed its deep concern with custodial demoralising
effect with custodial torture was creating on the society as
a whole.  It made some very useful suggestions. It suggested
:
     ".......An      arrest    during   the
     investigation of  a cognizable case
     may be  considered justified in one
     or      other       of    the    following
     circumstances :-
     (1)  The  case   involves    a  grave
     offence   like   murder,    dacoity,
     robbery,  rape   etc.,  and  it  is
     necessary to arrest the accused and
     bring his movements under restraint
     to     infuse      confidence  among  the
     terror stricken victims.
     (ii)  The     accused  is  likely  to
     abscond and  evade the processes of
     law.
     (iii)     The accused  is given  to
     violent behaviour    and is likely to
     commit further  offences unless his
     movements     are    brought       under
     restraint.
     (iv) The  accused     is  a    habitual
     offender and unless kept in custody
     he     is  likely  to     commit     similar
     offences    again.     It   would   be
     desirable     to    insist     through
     departmental  instructions     that  a
     police  officer  making  an  arrest
     should  also  record  in  the  case
     diary the    reasons for  making  the
     arrest,  thereby    clarifying   his
     conformity      to    the    specified
     guidelines......"
     The recommendations  of the  Police Commission  (supra)
reflect the  constitutional concomitants  of the fundamental
right    to    personal     liberty    and       freedom.    These
recommendations, however,  have not  acquired any  statutory
status so far.
     This Court     in Joginder  Kumar Vs. State [1994 (4) SCC,
260] (to  which one  of us,  namely, Anand,  J. was a party)
considered the    dynamics of misuse of police power of arrest
and opined :
     "No arrest     can be     made because it
     is lawful for the police officer to
     do so.  The existence  of the power
     of     arrest      is  one   thing.   The
     justification for    the exercise  of
     it is  quite  another...No.  arrest
     should be made without a reasonable
     satisfaction  reached   after  some
     investigation about the genuineness
     and bonafides  of a complaint and a
     reasonable belief    both as     to  the
     person's complicity  and even so as
     to     the   need  to     effect     arrest.
     Denying person  his  liberty  is  a
     serious matter."
     Joginder Kumar's  case (supra)  involved  arrest  of  a
practising lawyer  who had  bee called to the police station
in connection  with a  case under  inquiry on 7.1.94. On not
receiving any  satisfactory account  of his whereabouts, the
family member of the detained lawyer preferred a petition in
the nature of habeas corpus before this Court on 11.1.94 and
in compliance  with the     notice, the  lawyer was produced on
14.1.94 before this court the police version was that during
7.1.94 and  14.1.94 the     lawyer was  not in detention at all
but was     only assisting the police to detect some cases. The
detenue asserted  otherwise. This  Court was  not  satisfied
with the  police version.  It was  noticed that though as on
that day  the relief  in habeas corpus petition could not be
granted but the questions whether there had been any need to
detain the  lawyer for    5 days    and if    at all he was not in
detention  then     why  was  this     Court    not  informed.    Were
important questions  which required  an answer.     Besides, if
there was  detention for  5 days,  for what  reason  was  he
detained. The Court' therefore, directed the District Judge,
Ghaziabad to  make a  detailed enquiry and submit his report
within 4  weeks. The  Court  voiced  its  concern  regarding
complaints of  violations of  human rights  during and after
arrest. It said:
     "The horizon  of  human  rights  is
     expanding. at  the same  time,  the
     crime rate     is also  increasing, Of
     late, this Court has been receiving
     complaints     about     violations   of
     human     rights      because     of
     indiscriminate arrests.  How are we
     to strike    a  balance  between  the
     two?
     ...................................
     A realistic approach should be made
     in     this    direction.  The     law  of
     arrest   is    one      of   balancing
     individual     rights,  liberties  and
     privileges, on  the one  hand,  and
     individual      duties,    obligations
     weighing and  balancing the rights,
     liberties    and   privileges  of  he
     single  individual      and  those  of
     individuals collectively; of simply
     deciding what  is wanted  and where
     to put the weight and the emphasis;
     of deciding  with    comes  first-the
     criminal  or   society,   the   law
     violator or the abider....."
This Court  then set  down certain procedural "requirements"
in cases of arrest.
     Custodial death is perhaps one of the worst crimes in a
civilised society  governed by    the Rule  of Law. The rights
inherent in  Articles  21  and    22(1)  of  the    Constitution
required to  be jealously  and    scrupulously  protected.  We
cannot wish  away the problem. Any form of torture of cruel,
inhuman     or   degrading     treatment  would  fall     within     the
inhibition of  Article 21  of the  Constitution, whether  it
occurs during  investigation, interrogation or otherwise. If
the functionaries  of the Government become law breakers, it
is bound  to breed  contempt for  law  and  would  encourage
lawlessness and     every man would have the tendency to become
law  unto   himself  thereby   leading    to  anarchanism.  No
civilised nation  can permit  that tp happen. Does a citizen
shed off  his  fundamental  right  to  life,  the  moment  a
policeman arrests him? Can the right to life of a citizen be
put in    abeyance on  his arrest?  These questions  touch the
spinal court  of human    rights    jurisprudence.    The  answer,
indeed, has  to be  an emphatic     'No'.    The  precious  right
guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India cannot
be denied  to  convicted  undertrials,    detenues  and  other
prisoners in  custody, except  according  to  the  procedure
established by    law by    placing such reasonable restrictions
as are permitted by law.
     In Neelabati  Bahera Vs. State of Orissa [1993 (2) SCC,
746], (to  which Anand,     J. was     a party) this Court pointed
out that  prisoners and     detenues are  not denuded  of their
fundamental rights  under Article  21 and  it is  only    such
restrictions as     are permitted    by law, which can be imposed
on the    enjoyment of the fundamental rights of the arrestees
and detenues. It was observed :
     "It  is  axiomatic     that  convicts,
     prisoners or  undertrials    are  not
     denuded of their fundamental rights
     under Article  21 and  its is  only
     such restrictions, as are permitted
     by law, which can be imposed on the
     enjoyment of  the fundamental right
     by      such     persons.   It     is   an
     obligation of  the State  to ensure
     that there     is no    infringement  of
     the  indefeasible     rights      of   a
     citizen   o    life,   except    in
     accordance     with    law,  while  the
     citizen  is  in  its  custody.  The
     precious    right     guaranteed   by
     Article 21     of the     constitution of
     India cannot be denied to convicts,
     undertrials or  other prisoners  in
     custody,    expect      according   to
     procedure established by law. There
     is a  great   responsibility on the
     police  or     prison     authorities  to
     ensure  that  the    citizen     in  its
     custody  is  not  deprived     of  his
     right to  life. His  liberty is  in
     the   very       nature   of      things
     circumscribed by  the very     fact of
     his confinement  and therefore  his
     interest  in  the    limited     liberty
     left to him is rather precious. The
     duty of  care on  the part     of  the
     State is  responsible if the person
     in     custody   of  the   police   is
     deprived    of   his   life      except
     according      to    the    procedure
     established by law.
     Instances have  come to  out notice were the police has
arrested a  person without  warrant in    connection with     the
investigation of  an offence,  without recording the arrest,
and the     arrest person    has been  subjected  to     torture  to
extract information  from him  for the    purpose     of  further
investigation or  for recovery     of  case  property  or     for
extracting confession  etc. The torture and injury caused on
the body  of the  arrestee has    sometime resulted  into     his
death. Death  in custody  is  not  generally  shown  in     the
records of  the lock-up     and every  effort is  made  by     the
police to dispose of the body or to make out a case that the
arrested person died after he was released from custody. Any
complaint against  such torture     or death  is generally     not
given any  attention by     the police officers because of ties
of brotherhood.     No first information report at the instance
of the    victim or  his kith and kin is generally entertained
and even the higher police officers turn a blind eye to such
complaints. Even  where a  formal prosecution is launched by
the victim  or his  kith and  kin,  no    direct    evidence  is
available to  substantiate the    charge of torture or causing
hurt resulting    into  death  as     the  police  lock-up  where
generally torture  or injury  is caused     is  away  from     the
public gaze  and the  witnesses are either police men or co-
prisoners who  are highly reluctant to appear as prosecution
witness due  to fear of letaliation by the superior officers
of the    police. It  is often  seen that     when a complaint is
made against torture, death or injury, in police custody, it
is  difficult  to  secure  evidence  against  the  policemen
responsible for resorting to third degree methods since they
are incharge  of police     station records  which they  do not
find  difficult     to  manipulate.  Consequently,     prosecution
against     the   delinquent  officers   generally     results  in
acquittal. State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Shyamsunder Trivedi &
Ors. [ 1995 (3) Scale, 343 =] is an apt case illustrative of
the observations  made by  us above.  In  that    case,  Nathu
Bnjara was  tortured at     police station,  Rampura during the
interrogation. As  a result  of extensive injuries caused to
him he    died in     police custody     at the     police station. The
defence set  up by  the respondent  police officials  at the
trial was  that Nathu  Banjara had been released from police
custody at  about 10.30     p.m. after interrogation 13.10.1986
itself vide  entry EX.    P/22A in  the Roznamcha     and that at
about 7.00  a.m. on  14.10.1981, a  death report Ex. P/9 was
recorded at  the police station, Rampura, at the instance of
Ramesh respondent  No. 6,  to the  effect that    he had found
"one unknown  person" near  a tree  by the  side of the tank
riggling with  pain in    his chest  and that  as     a  soon  as
respondent No. 6 reached near him, the said person died. The
further case  set  up  by  SI  Trivedi,     respondent  No.  1,
incharge of  the police     station was  that  after  making  a
Roznamcha   entry at  7.00 a.m. about his departure from the
police station    he (respondent    No. 1-    Shyamsunder Trivedi)
and Constable Rajaram respondent proceeded to the spot where
the  dead  body     was  stated  to  be  lying  for  conducting
investigation under  Section 174  Cr.P.C. He summoned Ramesh
Chandra and  Goverdhan respondents  to the spot and in their
presence prepared  a panchnama    EX. P/27  of the  dead    body
recording the opinion therein to the effect that no definite
cause of death was known.
     The First    Additional Sessions  Judge acquitted all the
respondents of    all the     charges holding  that there  was no
direct evidence     to connect  the respondents with the crime.
The State  of Madhya  Pradesh went  up in appeal against the
order  of  acquittal  and  the    High  Court  maintained     the
acquittal of  respondents 2 to 7 but set aside the acquittal
of respondent  No. 1, Shyamsunder Trivedi for offences under
Section 218, 201 and 342 IPC. His acquittal for the offences
under Section  302/149 and 147 IPC was, however, maintained.
The State  filed an  appeal in    this court by special leave.
This Court  found that the following circumstances have been
established by the prosecution beyond every reasonable doubt
and coupled  with the  direct evidence of PWs 1, 3, 4, 8 and
18  those   circumstances  were     consistent  only  with     the
hypothesis  of     the  quilt  of     the  respondents  and    were
inconsistent with their innocence :
     (a)  that    the  deceased  had  been
     brought alive to the police station
     ad was  last seen    alive  there  on
     13.10.81;
     (b)  That    the  dead  body     of  the
     deceased  was   taken  out     of  the
     police station  on 14.1.81 at about
     2 p.m.  for being    removed     to  the
     hospital;
     (c)  that SI Trivedi respondent No.
     1, Ram  Naresh  shukla,  Respondent
     No. 3,  Raja Ram,    respondent No. 4
     and Ganiuddin respondent No. 5 were
     present at     the police  station and
     had all  joined hands to dispose of
     the dead body of Nathu-Banjara:
     (d)  That    SI  Trivedi,  respondent
     No. 1  created false  evidence  and
     fabricated false clues in the shape
     of documentary evidence with a view
     to screen    the offence and for that
     matter, the offender:
     (e)  SI   Trivedi     respondent   in
     connivance      with     some    of   his
     subordinates,  respondents      herein
     had taken steps to cremate the dead
     body  in    haste    describing   the
     deceased as  a 'lavaris' though the
     identity of the deceased, when they
     had interrogated  for a  sufficient
     long time was well known to them.
     and opined that:
     "The observations of the High Court
     that the presence and participation
     of these  respondents in  the crime
     is doubtful  are not borne out from
     the  evidence  on    the  record  and
     appear to    be an  unrealistic  over
     simplification  of     the  tell  tale
     circumstances  established     by  the
     prosecution."
     One of  us (namely,  Anand, J.)  speaking for the Court
went on to  observe :
     "The  trial   court  and  the  High
     Court,  if      we  may  say    so  with
     respect, exhibited     a total lack of
     sensitivity  and    a   'could   not
     careless' attitude     in appreciating
     the  evidence  on    the  record  and
     thereby  condoning      the  barbarous
     there  degree   methods  which  are
     still being  used, at  some  police
     stations,    despite     being    illegal.
     The exaggerated  adherence     to  and
     insistence upon  the  establishment
     of proof  beyond  every  reasonable
     doubt, by the prosecution, ignoring
     the  ground   realities,  the  fact
     situations      and     the    peculiar
     circumstances of  a given    case, as
     in the  present case, often results
     in miscarriage of justice and makes
     the  justice   delivery  system   a
     suspect. In  the ultimate    analysis
     the society  suffers and a criminal
     gets encouraged. Tortures in police
     custody, which  of late  are on the
     increase, receive    encouragement by
     this   type   of    an   unrealistic
     approach of  the Courts  because it
     reinforces the  belief in    the mind
     of the  police that  no harm  would
     come to  them if  an  odd    prisoner
     dies in  the lock-up, because there
     would  hardly   be      and    evidence
     available    to  the     prosecution  to
     directly implicate     them  with  the
     torture. The Courts, must not loose
     sight of  the   fact that    death in
     police custody is perhaps on of the
     worst  kind   of  crime   in  a   a
     civilised society,     governed by the
     rule of  law and  poses  a     serious
     thereat  to  an  orderly  civilised
     society."
     This Court then suggested :
     "The Courts  are also  required  to
     have a  change in their outlook and
     attitude,    particularly   in  cases
     involving custodial crimes and they
     should exhibit more sensitivity and
     adopt a  realistic     rather     than  a
     narrow  technical    approach,  while
     dealing with  the case of custodial
     crime so  that as    far as    possible
     within  their  powers,  the  guilty
     should  not   escape  so  that  the
     victim    of    crime    has    the
     satisfaction  that     ultimately  the
     Majesty of Law has prevailed."
     The State    appeal was  allowed  and  the  acquittal  of
respondents 1,    3, 4  and 5  was set  aside. The respondents
were convicted    for various  offences including     the offence
under Section  304 Part     II/34 IPC  and sentenced to various
terms of  imprisonment and fine ranging from Rs. 20,000/- to
Rs.. 50,000/-. The fine was directed to be paid to the heirs
of Nathu  Banjara by  way of  compensation. It    was  further
directed :
     "The Trial     Court shall  ensure, in
     case the  fine is    deposited by the
     accused   respondents,   that   the
     payment of     the same is made to the
     heirs of  deceased     Nathu    Banjara,
     and the  Court shall  take all such
     precautions as are necessary to see
     that the  money is     not allowed  to
     fall  into      wrong     hands     and  is
     utilised for  the    benefit     of  the
     members  of   the    family     of  the
     deceased  Nathu   Banjara,     and  if
     found  practical    by  deposit   in
     nationalised Bank or post office on
     such terms     as the     Trial Court may
     in consultation  with the heirs for
     the  deceased   consider  fit   and
     proper."
     It needs  no emphasis  to say  that when the crime goes
unpunished, the     criminals are    encouraged and    the  society
suffers. The  victim of     crime or  his kith  and kin  become
frustrated and contempt for law develops. It was considering
these aspects  that the     Law Commission     in its 113th Report
recommended the     insertion of  Section 114B  in     the  Indian
Evidence Act.  The Law    Commission recommended    in its 113th
Report that  in prosecution  of     a  police  officer  for  an
alleged offence     of having caused bodily injury to a person,
if there  was evidence that the injury was caused during the
period when the person was in the custody of the police, the
Court may  presume that     the injury was caused by the police
officer having the custody of the person during that period.
The Commission    further recommended  that the  court,  while
considering the     question of presumption, should have regard
to  all     relevant  circumstances  including  the  period  of
custody statement  made by  the victim, medical evidence and
the evidence  with the    Magistrate may have recorded. Change
of burden  of proof  was, thus,     advocated. In    sham  Sunder
Trivedi's case    (supra) this  Court also  expressed the hope
that the  Government and  the legislature would give serious
thought     to   the  recommendation  of  the  Law     Commission.
Unfortunately,    the   suggested     amendment,   has  not    been
incorporated in     the statute  so far.  The need of amendment
requires no  emphasis -     sharp rise  i    custodial  violence,
torture and  death in custody, justifies the urgency for the
amendment and we invite Parliament's attention to it.
     Police is,     no  doubt,  under  a  legal  duty  and     has
legitimate right to arrest a criminal and to interrogate him
during the  investigation of  a an  offence but     it must  be
remembered that     the law does not permit use of third degree
methods     or   torture    of   accused   in   custody   during
interrogation and  investigation with that view to solve the
crime. End  cannot justify  the means. The interrogation and
investigation into  a crime  should be in true sense purpose
full to     make the  investigation effective.  By torturing  a
person and  using their     degree methods, the police would be
accomplishing behind  the closed  doors what  the demands of
our legal order forbid. No. society can permit it.
     How do we check the abuse of police power? Transparency
of  action  and     accountability     perhaps  are  tow  possible
safeguards which  this Court  must insist upon. Attention is
also required  to be  paid to properly develop work culture,
training and  orientation of  police force  consistent    with
basic human values. Training methodology of the police needs
restructuring. The  force needs     to be    infused     with  basic
human values and made sensitive to the constitutional ethos.
Efforts must  be made to change the attitude and approach of
the police  personal handling investigations so that they do
not sacrifice basic human values during interrogation and do
not resort  to questionable  form of  interrogation. With  a
view to     bring in  transparency, the presence of the counsel
of  the      arrestee  at     some  point   of  time     during     the
interrogation may  deter the  police from using third degree
methods during interrogation.
     Apart  from   the    police,      there     are  several  other
governmental authorities  also like  Directorate of  Revenue
Intelligence,  Directorate  of    Enforcement,  Costal  Guard,
Central Reserve     Police Force  (CRPF), Border Security Force
(BSF), the  Central Industrial    Security Force    (CISF),     the
State  Armed   Police,    Intelligence   Agencies      like     the
Intelligence Bureau,  R.A.W, Central Bureau of Investigation
(CBI) ,     CID, Tariff  Police, Mounted  Police and ITBP which
have the power to detain a person and to interrogated him in
connection with     the  investigation  of     economic  offences,
offences under    the Essential  Commodities Act,     Excise     and
Customs Act.  Foreign Exchange Regulation Act etc. There are
instances  of    torture     and   death  in  custody  of  these
authorities as    well, In  re Death  of Sawinder Singh Grover
[1995 Supp  (4) SCC,  450], (to which Kuldip Singh, j. was a
party) this  Court took     suo moto  notice of  the  death  of
Sawinder  Singh      Grover  during   his    custody      with     the
Directorate  of      Enforcement.    After    getting     an  enquiry
conducted by  the additional District Judge, which disclosed
a prima     facie case  for investigation and prosecution, this
Court directed    the CBI to lodge a FIR and initiate criminal
proceeding against  all persons     named in  the report of the
Additional District  Judge and    proceed     against  them.     The
Union of  India/Directorate of Enforcement was also directed
to pay sum of Rs. 2 lacs to the widow of the deceased by was
of the relevant provisions of law to protect the interest of
arrested persons in such cases too is a genuine need.
     There  is     one  other  aspect  also  which  needs     out
consideration, We  are conscious of the fact that the police
in India  have to  perform a  difficult and  delicate  task,
particularly in     view of  the deteriorating  law  and  order
situation,  communal   riots,  political   turmoil,  student
unrest,     terrorist   activities,  and    among    others     the
increasing  number   of     underworld   and  armed  gangs     and
criminals, Many     hard core  criminals  like  extremist,     the
terrorists, drug  peddlers,  smugglers    who  have  organised
gangs, have  taken strong  roots in the society. It is being
said  in   certain  quarters   that  with   more  and    more
liberalisation and  enforcement of  fundamental     rights,  it
would lead  to    difficulties  in  the  detection  of  crimes
committed by  such categories  of hardened criminals by soft
peddling interrogation. It is felt in those quarters that if
we  lay      to  much   of     emphasis  on  protection  of  their
fundamental rights  and human  rights such  criminals may go
scot-free  without   exposing  any   element  or   iota      or
criminality with  the result,  the crime would go unpunished
and in    the ultimate  analysis the society would suffer. The
concern is  genuine and     the problem  is real.    To deal with
such a    situation, a balanced approach is needed to meet the
ends of     justice. This    all the     more so,  in  view  of     the
expectation of    the society  that police  must deal with the
criminals in  an efficient and effective manner and bring to
book those  who are  involved in the crime. The cure cannot,
however, be worst than the disease itself.
     The response  of the  American supreme Court to such an
issue in Miranda Vs. Arizona, 384 US 436 is instructive. The
Court said :
     "A     recurrent   argument,    made  in
     these cases  is that society's need
     for  interrogation     out-weighs  the
     privilege.     This  argument     is  not
     unfamiliar to this Court. See. e.g.
     Chambers v.  Florida, 309    US  227,
     240-41, 84     L ed  716, 724, 60 S Ct
     472 (1940). The whose thrust of out
     foregoing    discussion  demonstrates
     that    the     Constitution    has
     prescribed     the   rights    of   the
     individual when confronted with the
     power   of      Government   when   it
     provided  in  the    Fifth  Amendment
     that  an    individual   cannot   be
     compelled to  be a     witness against
     himself.  That   right  cannot   be
     abridged. "
         (Emphasis ours)
     There  can     be  no     gain  saying  that  freedom  of  an
individual must     yield to  the security     of the     State.     The
right of preventive detention of individuals in the interest
of security  of the  State in  various situations prescribed
under different     statures has been upheld by the Courts. The
right to  interrogate the detenues, culprits or arrestees in
the interest  of the  nation, must  take precedence  over an
individual's right  to personal     liberty.  The    latin  maxim
salus populi  est supreme  lex (the  safety of the people is
the supreme  law)  and    salus  republicae  est    suprema     lex
(safety of  the state  is the  supreme law) co-exist an dare
not only  important and relevant but lie at the heart of the
doctrine that  the welfare  of an  individual must  yield to
that of the community. The action of the State, however must
be "right,  just and  fair". Using  any form  of torture for
extracting any    kind of     information would neither be 'right
nor just  nor fair'  and, therefore, would be impermissible,
being offensive     to Article 21. Such a crime-suspect must be
interrogated -    indeed subjected to sustained and scientific
interrogation determined  in accordance     with the provisions
of law.     He cannot,  however, be  tortured or  subjected  to
third degree  methods or  eleminated with  a view  to elicit
information, extract confession or drive knowledge about his
accomplices, weapons etc. His Constitutional right cannot be
abridged except     in the     manner permitted  by law, though in
the  very  nature  of  things  there  would  be     qualitative
difference in  the methods of interrogation of such a person
as compared  to an ordinary criminal. Challenge of terrorism
must  be  met  wit  innovative    ideas  and  approach.  State
terrorism is not answer to combat terrorism. State terrorism
is no answer to combat terrorism. State terrorism would only
provide legitimacy to 'terrorism'. That would be bad for the
State, the  community and above all for the Rule of Law. The
State must, therefore, ensure that various agencies deployed
by it  for combating  terrorism act within the bounds of law
and not     become law  unto themselves. that the terrorist has
violated human    rights of  innocent citizens  may render him
liable for punishment but it cannot justify the violation of
this human  rights expect  in the  manner permitted  by law.
Need,  therefore,   is    to  develop  scientific     methods  of
investigation  and   train  the     investigators    properly  to
interrogate to meet the challenge.
     In     addition   to    the   statutory     and  constitutional
requirements to     which we  have made  a reference, we are of
the view  that it would be useful and effective to structure
appropriate  machinery    for  contemporaneous  recording     and
notification of     all cases  of arrest and detention to bring
in transparency and accountability. It is desirable that the
officer arresting  a person  should prepare  a memo  of     his
arrest on  witness who    may be a member of the family of the
arrestee or  a respectable person of the locality from where
the arrest  is made.  The date    and time  of arrest shall be
recorded in  The memo  which must  also be counter signed by
The arrestee.
     We therefore,  consider it     appropriate  to  issue     the
following requirements to be followed in all cases of arrest
or detention  till legal  provisions are made in that behalf
as preventive measures :
(1)  The  police  personnel  carrying  out  the     arrest     and
handling the  interrogation  of     the  arrestee    should    bear
accurate, visible  and clear  identification and  name    togs
with their  designations. The particulars of all such police
personnel who  handle interrogation  of the arrestee must be
recorded in a register.
(2)  That the  police officer carrying out the arrest of the
arrestee shall    prepare a  memo of  arrest at  the  time  of
arrest a such memo shall be attested by atleast one witness.
who may     be either a member of the family of the arrestee or
a respectable  person of  the locality from where the arrest
is made. It shall also be counter signed by the arrestee and
shall contain the time and date of arrest.
(3)  A person who has been arrested or detained and is being
held in     custody in a police station or interrogation centre
or other  lock-up, shall  be entitled  to have one friend or
relative or  other person known to him or having interest in
his welfare  being informed, as soon as practicable, that he
has been  arrested and    is being  detained at the particular
place, unless the attesting witness of the memo of arrest is
himself such a friend or a relative of the arrestee.
(4)  The time,    place of  arrest and  venue of custody of an
arrestee must  be notified  by the  police  where  the    next
friend    or  relative  of  the  arrestee     lives    outside     the
district or  town through  the legal Aid Organisation in the
District and  the  police  station  of    the  area  concerned
telegraphically within    a period  of 8 to 12 hours after the
arrest.
(5)  The person arrested must be made aware of this right to
have someone  informed of his arrest or detention as soon he
is put under arrest or is detained.
(6)  An entry  must be    made in     the diary  at the  place of
detention regarding  the arrest     of the     person which  shall
also disclose  the name     of he next friend of the person who
has been informed of the arrest an the names and particulars
of the police officials in whose custody the arrestee is.
(7)  The arrestee  should, where  he so     requests,  be    also
examined at  the time  of his  arrest and  major  and  minor
injuries, if  any present  on his/her body, must be recorded
at that     time. The  "Inspection Memo" must be signed both by
the arrestee and the police officer effecting the arrest and
its copy provided to the arrestee.
(8)  The arrestee should be subjected to medical examination
by trained  doctor every  48 hours  during his    detention in
custody by  a  doctor  on  the    panel  of  approved  doctors
appointed by  Director, Health    Services  of  the  concerned
Stare or  Union Territory.  Director, Health Services should
prepare such a penal for all Tehsils and Districts as well.
(9)  Copies of    all the     documents  including  the  memo  of
arrest, referred  to above,  should be    sent to     the  illaga
Magistrate for his record.
(10) The arrestee may be permitted to meet his lawyer during
interrogation, though not throughout the interrogation.
(11) A    police    control     room  should  be  provided  at     all
district and state headquarters, where information regarding
the arrest and the place of custody of the arrestee shall be
communicated by     the officer  causing the  arrest, within 12
hours of effecting the arrest and at the police control room
it should be displayed on a conspicuous notice board.
     Failure to     comply with  the  requirements     hereinabove
mentioned shall     apart from rendering the concerned official
liable for departmental action, also render his liable to be
punished for  contempt of  court  and  the  proceedings     for
contempt of court may be instituted in any High Court of the
country, having territorial jurisdiction over the matter.
     The requirements,    referred to above flow from Articles
21 and    22 (1)    of the    Constitution and need to be strictly
followed. These     would apply  with equal  force to the other
governmental agencies  also to    which a     reference has    been
made earlier.
     These   requirements    are   in     addition   to     the
constitutional and  statutory safeguards  and do not detract
from various  other directions given by the courts from time
to time     in connection    with the  safeguarding of the rights
and dignity of the arrestee.
     The requirements  mentioned above shall be forwarded to
the Director  General of  Police and  the Home    Secretary of
every Stare/Union Territory and it shall be their obligation
to circulate  the same    to every  police station under their
charge and  get the same notified at every police station at
conspicuous place.  It would also be useful and serve larger
interest to  broadcast the  requirements on  the  All  India
Radio  besides    being  shown  on  the  National     network  of
Doordarshan and     by publishing and distributing pamphlets in
the  local   language  containing   these  requirements     for
information of    the general public. Creating awareness about
the rights of the arrestee would in out opinion be a step in
the right  direction to     combat the  evil of custodial crime
and bring  in transparency  and accountability.     It is hoped
that these  requirements would    help to curb, if not totally
eliminate,  the      use    of   questionable   methods   during
interrogation  and   investigation  leading   to   custodial
commission of crimes.
PUNITIVE MEASURES
UBI JUS     IBI REMEDIUM  - There is no wrong without a remedy.
The law     will that  in every  case where  man is wronged and
undamaged he  must have     a remedy.  A  mere  declaration  of
invalidity of  an action or finding of custodial violence or
death in  lock-up does    not by itself provide any meaningful
remedy to  a person whose fundamental right to life has been
infringed. Much more needs to be done.
     Some punitive  provisions are  contained in  the Indian
Penal  Code which seek to punish violation of right to life.
Section     220  provides    for  punishment     to  an     officer  or
authority who  detains or keeps a person in confinement with
a corrupt  or malicious     motive. Section 330 and 331 provide
for punishment    of those who inflict injury of grievous hurt
on a person to extort confession or information in regard to
commission of  an  offence.  Illustration  (a)    and  (b)  to
Section 330  make a  police officer  guilty of    torturing  a
person in order to induce him to confess the commission of a
crime or  to induce him to confess the commission of a crime
or to  induce him  to point out places where stolen property
is deposited. Section 330, therefore, directly makes torture
during interrogation  and investigation punishable under the
Indian Penal  Code. These Statutory provisions are, However,
inadequate  to     repair     the  wrong  done  to  the  citizen.
Prosecution of the offender is an obligation of the State in
case of     every crime  but the  victim of  crime needs  to be
compensated  monetarily      also.      The    Court,     where     the
infringement  of   the    fundamental  right  is    established,
therefore, cannot stop by giving a mere declaration. It must
proceed further     and give compensatory relief, nor by way of
damages as  in a  civil action    but by    way of    compensation
under the public law jurisdiction for the wrong done, due to
breach of  public duty    by the    State of  not protecting the
fundamental right  to life  of the  citizen. To     repair     the
wrong done  and give  judicial redress for legal injury is a
compulsion of judicial conscience.
     Article 9(5)  of the International convent on civil and
Political Rights, 1966 (ICCPR) provides that "anyone who has
been the  victim of  unlawful arrest or detention shall have
enforceable  right   to     compensation".      of   course,     the
Government of  India as     the time  of its  ratification     (of
ICCPR) in 1979 had made a specific reservation to the effect
that the  Indian legal    system does not recognise a right to
compensation for victims of unlawful arrest or detention and
thus did  not become party to the Convent. That reservation,
however, has  now lost its relevance in view of the law laid
down by     this Court in number of cases awarding compensation
for the     infringement of  the fundamental right to life of a
citizen. (See with advantage Rudal Shah Vs. State of Bihar [
1983 (4) SCC, 141 ]: Sebastian M. Hongrey Vs. Union of India
[ 1984    (3) SCC,  339] and  1984 (3) SCC, 82]; Bhim Singh Vs
State of  J & K [1984 (Supp) SCC, 504 and 1985 (4) SCC, 677]
Saheli Vs.  Commissioner of  Police.  Delhi  [1990  (1)     SCC
422]}.    There    is  indeed   no     express  provision  in     the
Constitution  of   India  for    grant  of  compensation     for
violation of  a fundamental right to life, nonetheless, this
Court has judicially evolved a right o compensation in cases
of  established      unconstitutional  deprivation      of  person
liberty or life. [See : Nilabati Bahara Vs. State (Supra)]
     Till  about  tow  decades    ago  the  liability  of     the
government for    tortious  act  of  its    public    servants  as
generally limited  and the person affected could enforce his
right in  tort by  filing a  civil suit     and there again the
defence     of sovereign immunity was allowed to have its play.
For the     violation of  the fundamental    right to life or the
basic human  rights, however,  this Court has taken the view
that the  defence of  sovereign immunity is not available to
the State  for the  tortious act  of the public servants and
for the     established violation    of the    rights guaranteed by
Article 21  of the Constitution of India. In Nilabati Behera
Vs. State  (supra) the decision of this Court in Kasturi Lal
Ralia Ram Jain Vs. State of U.P. [1965 (1) SCR, 375] wherein
the plea  of sovereign immunity had been upheld in a case of
vicarious liability  of the  State for the tort committed by
its employees was explained thus:
     "In this  Context, it is sufficient
     to say  that the  decision of  this
     Court in  Kasturilal upholding  the
     State's plea  of sovereign immunity
     for tortious  acts of  its servants
     is     confined   to    the   sphere  of
     liability     in   tort,   which   is
     distinct from the State's liability
     for  contravention     of  fundamental
     rights to    which  the  doctrine  of
     sovereign      immunity     has    no
     application in  the  constitutional
     remedy under Articles 32 and 226 of
     the  Constitution     which     enables
     award    of     compensation    for
     contravention    of     fundamental
     rights, when  the only  practicable
     mode   of      enforcement    of   the
     fundamental rights can be the award
     of compensation.  The decisions  of
     this court     in Rudul Sah and others
     in that  line relate  to  award  of
     compensation for  contravention  of
     fundamental    rights,    in    the
     constitutional remedy upon Articles
     32 and  226 of the Constitution, On
     the other    hand, Kasturilal related
     to the  value of  goods seized  and
     not returned  to the  owner due  to
     the fault    of government  Servants,
     the claim    being of  damages of the
     tort  of    conversion   under   the
     ordinary process,    and not     a claim
     for compensation  for violation  of
     fundamental rights.  Kasturilal is,
     therefore,     inapplicable    in  this
     context and distinguishable."
     The  claim      in  public   law  for      compensation     for
unconstitutional deprivation  of fundamental  right to    life
and liberty, the protection of which is guaranteed under the
Constitution, is a claim based on strict liability and is in
addition to  the claim    available in private law for damages
of  tortious   acts  of     the  public  servants.     Public     law
proceedings serve  a different    purpose than the private law
proceedings.   Award   of   compensation   for     established
infringement of     the indefeasible  rights  guaranteed  under
Article 21  of the  Constitutions  is  remedy  available  in
public law  since the  purpose of  public law is not only to
civilise public     power but  also to assure the citizens that
they live  under a  legal system  wherein their     rights     and
interests  shall   be  protected  and  preserved.  Grant  of
compensation in     proceedings under  Article 32 or 226 of the
Constitution of     India for  the established violation or the
fundamental  rights  guaranteed     under    Article     21,  is  an
exercise of the Courts under the public law jurisdiction for
penalising the    wrong door  and fixing the liability for the
public wrong  on the  State which failed in the discharge of
its public  duty to  protect the  fundamental rights  of the
citizen.
     The old  doctrine of  only relegating  the aggrieved to
the remedies  available in  civil law limits the role of the
courts too  much, as  the protector  and  custodian  of     the
indefeasible rights  of the  citizens. The  courts have     the
obligation to satisfy the social aspirations of the citizens
because the  court and    the  law  are  for  the     people     and
expected to  respond to     their aspirations.  A Court  of law
cannot    close  its  consciousness  and    aliveness  to  stark
realities. Mere     punishment of the offender cannot give much
solace to the family of the victim - civil action for damage
is a  long drawn  and cumber some judicial process. Monetary
compensation  for   redressal  by   the     Court    finding     the
infringement of     the  indefeasible  right  to  life  of     the
citizen is,  therefore, useful and at times perhaps the only
effective remedy  to apply  balm to the wounds of the family
members of  the deceased victim. Who may have been the bread
winner of the family.
     In Nilabati Bahera's case (supra), it was held:
     "Adverting to  the grant  of relief
     to     the   heirs  of   a  victim  of
     custodial death  for the infraction
     or      invasion    of   his      rights
     guaranteed under  Article 21 of the
     Constitution of  India, it     is  not
     always enough  to relegate     him  to
     the ordinary remedy of a civil suit
     to claim  damages for  the tortious
     act of  the State as that remedy in
     private law  indeed is available to
     the aggrieved  party.  The     citizen
     complaining of  the infringement of
     the   indefeasible       right   under
     Article  21   of  the  constitution
     cannot  be      told    that   for   the
     established   violation    of   the
     fundamental right to life he cannot
     get any relief under the public law
     by     the   courts  exercising   Writ
     jurisdiction, The primary source of
     the public     law  proceedings  stems
     from the  prerogative writs and the
     courts have  therefore, to evolve '
     new tools' to give relief in public
     law by moulding it according to the
     situation with  a view  to preserve
     and protect  the Rule of Law. While
     concluding his first Hamlyn Lecture
     in 1949  under the     title    "freedom
     under the    Law" Lord Denning in his
     own style warned :
      No one  ca  suppose  that  the
     executive will  never be guilty the
     of the  sins that are common to all
     of us.  Your may  be sure that they
     will sometimes to things which they
     ought to  do  :  and  will     not  do
     things that  they ought  to do. But
     if     and  when  wrongs  are     thereby
     suffered by  any of  us what is the
     remedy? Our  procedure for securing
     our personal  freedom is efficient,
     out procedure  for     preventing  the
     abuse of  power is not. Just as the
     pick  and     shovel     is   no  longer
     suitable for  the winning    of coal,
     so also  the procedure of mandamus,
     certiorari and  actions on the case
     are not suitable for the winning or
     freedom in     the new  age. They must
     be replaced  by new  and up-to date
     machinery       by       declarations,
     injunctions   and      actions    for
     negligence... This     is not the task
     of Parliament... the courts must do
     this. Of  all the    great tasks that
     lie ahead    this  is  the  greatest.
     Properly exercised     the new  powers
     of     the   executive  lead     to  the
     welfare state  :  but  abused  they
     lead to  a totalitarian state. None
     such must    ever be     allowed in this
     country."
     A similar    approach of redressing the wrong by award of
monetary compensation  against the  State for its failure to
protect the  fundamental rights     of  the  citizen  has    been
adopted by  the Courts    of  Ireland,  which  has  a  written
constitution, guaranteeing  fundamental     rights,  but  which
also like  the Indian  Constitution contains no provision of
remedy for  the infringement  of  those     rights.  That    has,
however, not  prevented the Court in Ireland from developing
remedies, including  the award    of damages, not only against
individuals guilty  of infringement,  but against  the State
itself.
     The  informative    and  educative    observations  of  O'
Dalaigh CJ  in The  State (At  the Prosecution    of Quinn) v.
Ryan [1965]  IR 70 (122) deserve special notice. The Learned
Chief Justice said:
     "It was  not the  intention of  the
     Constitution  in  guaranteeing  the
     fundamental rights     of the     citizen
     that these     rights should be set at
     nought   or    circumvented.    The
     intention    was   that   rights   of
     substances were  being  assured  to
     the individual  and that the Courts
     were  the     custodians   of   those
     rights. As     a necessary  corollary,
     it follows     that no  one  can  with
     impunity set these rights at nought
     of circumvent  them, and  that  the
     Court's powers  in this  regard are
     as ample  as  the    defence     of  the
     Constitution require."
      (Emphasis supplied)
     In Byrne  v. Ireland [1972] IR 241, Walsh J opined at p
264:
     "In   several    parts    in    the
     Constitution duties to make certain
     provisions for  the benefit  of the
     citizens are  imposed on  the State
     in terms  which bestow  rights upon
     the  citizens   and,  unless   some
     contrary provision     appears in  the
     Constitution, the Constitution must
     be deemed toe have created a remedy
     for  the    enforcement   of   these
     rights. It     follows that, where the
     right  is    one  guaranteed     by  the
     State. It is against the State that
     the remedy     must be sought it there
     has been a failure to discharge the
     constitutional obligation impose"
      (Emphasis supplied)
     In Maharaj     Vs. Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago
[  (1978)   2  All   E.R.  670].  The  Privy  Council  while
interpreting Section  6 of  the Constitution of Trinidad and
Tobago held  that though  not expressly provided therein, it
permitted an  order for     monetary compensation,     by  way  of
'redress' for  contravention of     the basic  human rights and
fundamental freedoms. Lord Diplock speaking for the majority
said:
     "It was  argued on     behalf     of  the
     Attorney General  that Section 6(2)
     does not  permit of  an  order  for
     monetary compensation  despite  the
     fact that    this kind of redress was
     ordered  in   Jaundoo  v.    Attorney
     General  of  Guyana.  Reliance  was
     placed on the reference in the sub-
     section to     'enforcing, or securing
     the  enforcement  of,  any     of  the
     provisions of  the     said  foregoing
     sections' as  the purpose for which
     orders etc. could be made. An order
     for payment of compensation, it was
     submitted, did  not amount     to  the
     enforcement of  the rights that had
     been    contravened.    In       their
     Lordships'     view    of   order   for
     payment  of   compensation     when  a
     right  protected  under  Section  1
     'has been' contravened is clearly a
     form of 'redress' which a person is
     entitled to  claim under  Section 6
     (1)  and    may  well  be  any  only
     practicable form  of redress, as by
     now it  is in the instant case. The
     jurisdiction to  make such an order
     is conferred  on the  High Court by
     para  (a)    of  Section  6(2),  viz.
     jurisdiction 'to here and determine
     any application  made by any person
     in pursuance  of sub-section (1) of
     this section'.  The very wide power
     to make  orders,  issue  writs  and
     give directions  are  ancillary  to
     this."
     Lord diplock then went on to observe ( at page 680) :
     "Finally, their Lordships would say
     something    about    the  measure  of
     monetary  compensation  recoverable
     under   Section    6   where    the
     contravention  of     the  claimant's
     constitutional rights  consists  of
     deprivation  of  liberty  otherwise
     that by   due  process of    law. The
     claim is not a claim in private law
     for damages  for the  tort of false
     imprisonment,     under  which  the
     damages recoverable  are  at  large
     and would    include damages for loss
     of reputation.  IT is  a  claim  in
     public  law  for  compensation  for
     deprivation of liberty alone."
     In Simpson     was, Attorney    General [  Baigent's case  ]
(1994 NZLR,  667) the  Court of     Appeal in  NewZealand dealt
with the  issue in a very elaborate manner by reference to a
catena    of  authorities     from  different  jurisdictions.  It
considered the    applicability of  the doctrine    of vicarious
liability  for torts, like unlawful search, committed by the
police officials  which violate     the  New  Zealand  Bill  of
Rights Act,  1990. While  dealing with    the  enforcement  of
rights and  freedoms as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights for
which no  specific remedy  was    provided.  Hardie  Boys,  J.
observed :
     "The New  Zealand    Bill  of  Rights
     Act, unless  it is     to be    no  more
     that  an    empty  statement,  is  a
     commitment by  the Crown that those
     who in  the three    branches of  the
     government exercise  its functions,
     powers and     duties will observe the
     rights hat     the Bill affirms. it is
     I     consider   implicit   in   that
     commitment, indeed essential to its
     worth, that the Courts are not only
     to     observe   the     Bill    in   the
     discharge of  their own  duties but
     are able  to grant     appropriate  ad
     effective    remedies   where  rights
     have  been      infringed.  I     see  no
     reason to    think that  this  should
     depend on    the terms  of a     written
     constitution.  Enjoyment    of   the
     basic   human    rights   are   the
     entitlement of  every citizen,  and
     their protection  the obligation of
     every  civilised  state.  They  are
     inherent in  and essential     to  the
     structure of  society. They  do not
     depend    on     the    legal    or
     constitutional form  in which  they
     are declared.  the     reasoning  that
     has led  the Privy     Council and the
     Courts of    Ireland and India to the
     conclusions reached in the cases to
     which I have referred (and they are
     but a  sample)  is     in  my     opinion
     equally valid  to the  New     Zealand
     Bill of Rights Act if it is to have
     life   and       meaning."   (Emphasis
     supplied)
     The Court    of appeal  relied upon    the judgment  of the
Irish Courts, the Privy Council and referred to the law laid
down in Nilabati Behera Vs. State (supra) thus:
     "Another valuable    authority  comes
     from India,  Where the constitution
     empowers  the   Supreme  Court   to
     enforce rights guaranteed under it.
     In     Nilabati  Bahera  V.  State  of
     Orissa (1993)  Cri.  LJ  2899,  the
     Supreme   Court   awarded     damages
     against the  Stare to the mother of
     a young  man  beaten  to  death  in
     police custody. The Court held that
     its power of enforcement  imposed a
     duty to "forge new tools", of which
     compensation was  an appropriate on
     where that     was the  only    mode  of
     redress available.     This Was  not a
     remedy in    tort, but  one in public
     law based    on strict  liability for
     the  contravention     of  fundamental
     rights to    which the  principle  of
     sovereign immunity     does not apply.
     These observations     of Anand, J. at
     P 2912 may be noted.
     The old doctrine of only relegating
     the  aggrieved   to  the    remedies
     available in  civil law  limits the
     role of  the  courts  too    much  as
     protector and  guarantor  of    the
     indefeasible    rights    of    the
     citizens.    The   courts  have   the
     obligation to  satisfy  the  social
     aspirations of the citizens because
     the courts     and the law are for the
     people and     expected to  respond to
     their aspirations.     The purpose  of
     public law     is not only to civilize
     public that they live under a legal
     system which  aims to protect their
     interest    and    preserve       their
     rights."
     Each the  five  members  of  the  Court  of  Appeal  in
Simpson's case    (supra) delivered  a separate  judgment     but
there was  unanimity  of  opinion  regarding  the  grant  of
pecuniary compensation    to the victim, for the contravention
of his    rights guaranteed  under the  Bill  of    Rights    Act,
notwithstanding the  absence of an express provision in that
behalf in the Bill of Rights Act.
     Thus, to  sum up, it is now a well accepted proposition
in most     of the     jurisdictions, that  monetary or  pecuniary
compensation is     an appropriate     and indeed an effective and
sometimes perhaps  the only suitable remedy for redressal of
the established     infringement of  the fundamental  right  to
life of     a citizen  by the  public servants and the State is
vicariously liable  for their acts. The claim of the citizen
is based  on the  principle of strict liability to which the
defence of  sovereign immunity    is  nor     available  and     the
citizen must  revive the  amount of  compensation  from     the
State, which  shall have  the right to be indemnified by the
wrong doer.  In the assessment of compensation, the emphasis
has to    be on  the compensatory and not on punitive element.
The objective  is to  apply balm  to the  wounds and  not to
punish    the   transgressor  or    the  offender,    as  awarding
appropriate  punishment      for  the   offender,    as  awarding
appropriate punishment    for  the  offence  (irrespective  of
compensation) must   be left to the criminal courts in which
the offender is prosecuted, which the State, in law, is duty
bound to  do, That  award of  compensation in the public law
jurisdiction is     also without  prejudice to any other action
like civil  suit for  damages which is lawfully available to
the victim  or the heirs of the deceased victim with respect
to the    same matter  for the  tortious act  committed by the
functionaries of  the State.  The  quantum  of    compensation
will. of course, depend upon the peculiar facts of each case
and no    strait jacket formula can be evolved in that behalf.
The relief to redress the wrong for the established invasion
of the    fundamental rights  of the  citizen, under he public
law jurisdiction is, in addition to the traditional remedies
and not     it derrogation     of them. The amount of compensation
as awarded by the Court and paid by the State to redress The
wrong done,  may in  a given  case , be adjusted against any
amount which  may be  awarded to  the  claimant     by  way  of
damages in a civil suit.
     Before parting  with this    judgment we wish to place on
record our  appreciation for  the learned  counsel appearing
for the     States in  general and     Dr. A.M.  Singhvi,  learned
senior counsel    who assisted  the  Court  amicus  curiae  in
particular for the valuable assistances rendered by them.

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Bench: A Anand, K Thomas
PETITIONER:
SHRI DILIP K. BASU ETC.ASHOK K. JOHARI
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/08/1997
BENCH:
A.S. ANAND, K.T. THOMAS
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
THE 1ST DAY OF AUGUST, 1997
Present:
Hon'ble Dr. Justice A.S. Anand Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.T. Thomas Dr. A.M. Singhvi, Additional Solicitor General (A.C.), Ms. Suruchi Agarwal, Sushil Kumar Jain, Y.P. Dhamija, B. Krishna Prasad, Ms. A. Subhashini, B.B. Singh, Uma Nath Singh, B.S. Chahar, Ashok Mathur, Ms. Hemantika Wahi, Ms. Nandini Mukherjee, Kailash Vasdev, C.K. Sasi Raj Kumar Mehta, Dilip Sinha, K.R. Nagaraja, Ms. S. Janani, Aruneshwar Gupta, G. Prakash, Ms. Beena Prakash, Shakil Ahmed Syed, S.N. Jadhav, D.M. Nargolkar, A.S. Pundit, R.B. Misra, Gunture Prabhakar, Prem Malhotra, M. Veerappa, R.S. Sodhi, J.K. Manhas, V. Krishnamurthy, D.N. Mukherjee, T. Sridharan, Gopal Singh, D.S. Mehra, Ms. Kamakshi Singh Mehlwal, V.G. Pragasam and Ms. Kamini Jaiswal, Advs. with him for the appearing parties.
O R D E R
The following Order of the Court was delivered: WITH
WRIT PETITION (CRL) no. 592 OF 1987 O R D E R
On December 18, 1996 in D.K. Basu Versus State of West Bengal (1997 (1) SCC 416), this court laid down certain basic "requirements" to be followed in all cases of arrest or detention till legal provisions are made in that behalf as a measure to prevent custodial violence. The requirements read as follows.
"1. The police personnel carrying out the arrest and handling the interrogation of the arrestee should bear accurate, visible and clear identification and name clear identification and name tags with their designations. The particulars of all such police personnel who handle interrogation of the arrestee must be recorded in a register.
2. That the police officer carrying out the arrest of the arrestee shall prepare a memo of arrest at the time of arrest and such memo shall be attested by at least one witness, who may either be a member of the family of the arrestee or a respectable person of the locality from where the arrest is made. It shall also be countersigned by the arrestee and shall contain the time and date of arrest.
3. A person who has been arrested or detained and is being held in custody in a police station or interrogation centre or other lock- up, shall be entitled to have one friend or relative or other person know to him or having interest in his welfare being informed, as soon as practicable, that he has been arrested and is being detained at the particular place, unless the attesting witness of the memo of arrest is himself such a friend or a relative of the arrestee.
4. The time, place of arrest and venue of custody of an arrestee must be notified by the police where the next friend or relative of the arrestee lives outside the district or town through the Legal Aid Organisation in the District and the police station of the area concerned telegraphically within a period of 8 to 12 hours after the arrest.
5. The person arrested must be made aware of this right to have someone informed of his arrest or detention as soon as he is put under arrest or is detained.
6. An entry must be made in the diary at the place of detention regarding the arrest of the person which shall also disclose the name of the next fried of the person who has been informed of the arrest and the names and particulars of the police officials in whose custody the arrestee is.
7. The arrestee should, where he so requests, be also examined at the time of his arrest and major and minor injuries, if any present on his/her body, must be recorded at that time. The "Inspection Memo" must be signed both by the arrestee and the police officer effecting the arrest and its copy provided to the arrestee and the police officer effecting the arrest and its copy provided to the arrestee.
8. The arrestee should be subjected to medical examination by a trained doctor every 48 hours during his detention in custody by a doctor on the panel of approved doctors appointed by Director, Health Services of the State or Union Territory concerned. Director, Health Services should prepare such a penal for all tehsils and districts as well.
9. Copies of all the documents including the memo of arrest, referred to above, should be sent to the Illega Magistrate for his record.
10. The arrestee may be permitted to meet his lawyer during interrogation, though not throughout the interrogation.
11. A police control room could be provided at all district and State headquarters, where information regarding the arrest and the place of custody of the arrestee shall be communicated by the officer causing the arrest, within 12 hours of effecting the arrest and at the police control room it should be displayed on a conspicuous notice board."
This court also opined that failure to comply with the above requirements, apart from rendering the official concerned liable for departmental action, would also render him liable to be punished for contempt of court and the proceedings for contempt of court could be instituted in any High Court of country, having territorial jurisdiction over the matter. This Court further observed : "The requirements mentioned above shall be forwarded to the Director General of every State/Union Territory and it shall be their obligation to circulate the same to every police station under their charge and get the same notified at every police station under their charge and get the same notified at every police station at a conspicuous place. It would also be useful and serve larger interest to broadcast the requirements on All India Radio besides being shown on the national Network of Doordarshan any by publishing and distributing pamphlets in the local language containing these requirements for information of the general public. Creating awareness about the lights of the arrestee would in our opinion be a step in the right direction to combat the evil of custodial crime and bring in transparency and accountability. It is hoped and accountability. It is hoped that thee requirements would help to curb, if not totally eliminate, the use of a questionable methods during interrogation and investigation leading to custodial commission of crimes."
More than seven months have elapsed since the directions were issued. Through these petitions, Dr. Singhvi, the learned Amicus Curiae, who had assisted the Court in the main petition, seeks a direction, calling upon the Director General of Police and the Home Secretary of every State/union Territory to report to this Curt compliance of the above directions and the steps taken by the All India Radio and the National Network of Doordarshan for broadcasting the requirements. We direct the Registry to send a copy of this application, together with a copy of this order to respondents 1 to 31 to have the report/reports from the Director General of Police and the Home Secretary of the concerned State/Union Territory, sent to this Court regarding the compliance of the above directions concerning arrestees. The report shall indicate in a tabular from a to which of the "requirements" has been carried out and in what manner, as also which are the "requirements" which still remain to be carried out and the steps being taken for carrying out those.
Report shall also be obtained from the Directors of All India Radio and Doordarshan regarding broadcasts made. The notice on respondents 1 to 31, in addition, may also be served through the standing counsel of the respective State/union Territories in the Supreme Court. After the reports are received, copies of the same shall be furnished to the Advocate on Record for Dr. Singhvi, Ms. Suruchi Agarwal, Advocate.
The reports shall be submitted to this court in the terms, indicated above, within six weeks from today. The matters shall be put up on board for monitoring, after seven weeks.
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